“Let's say we reduce world oil consumption from 80 million barrels per day to 70 million per day. We extend the peak time line by 1/8. So instead of a terrible peak in 2008, we get a horrific peak in 2010 instead.”
--I think this is possible, but it’s not a
definite given. See what I mean? For example, in the time between just these two points “a terrible peak in 2008” and a “horrific peak in 2010,” there isn’t only
one world scenario possible. Many scenarios could occur between those two times, many paths could be taken. The hyperconsumerism you mentioned may not happen, but even if did happen, what if it’s hyperconsumerism toward everyone going out and buying seeds of both wild and domesticated plants and replacing their monospecies grass yard with vegetable/fruit gardens and starting compost piles, so that they could grow more of their own food and use less gasoline in not having to run to the store as often everytime they need new food/ingredients, less gasoline in not having to depend so much on gasoline powered farm-grown food, and less gasoline by consuming less petro-packaging on their food? Over the shorter-term, that might cause a small rise in the amount of oil consumed between 2008-2010 while everyone rushes out to buy that organic stuff (but not necessarily since they would have been going out in the other scenario too for the purpose of buying all their food); however, that would be a preparation for the longer-term post-2010, so if it were done properly, it might mean that the peak at 2010 might
not feel as damaging afterward because many people will have set up a small system in place that might at least allow them to have some food for a few weeks/months if food production is interrupted. That doesn’t mean there won’t be a sharp collapse in fuel supply and quality of life after 2010, but it might not be as bad as you predicted. This is just one example; I can think of many more. I think there are likely degrees of hyperconsumerism (as there are likely degrees with anything) with varying amounts of damage attached—and the length of time over which that consumerism takes place is important too. Even while there might be some negative effects attached, if everyone went and planted food gardens right now where even half of their yard-grass sat, I think that would likely have an overall positive effect in many ways, over the short and long term.
“Anything that contributes to economic growth, therefore accelerates consumption, including conservation.”
--This is the argument that you keep using. Last night before I went to sleep I thought on all this some more and figured out another way to illustrate a big problem with that type of argument.
Let’s look at the following statement from this page again:
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreport ... EN=7028302
“The rebound effect (also referred to as the "take-back" or "snap-back") was first described in 1865 when Stanley Jevons observed that the introduction of the new efficient steam engine initially decreased coal consumption which led to a drop in the price of coal. This meant not only that more people could afford coal, but also that coal was now economically viable for new uses, which ultimately greatly increased coal consumption 2.”
--I’m going to pull out this part and label events:
the new efficient steam engine initially [decreased coal consumption (A)] which led to a drop in the price of coal. This meant not only that more people could afford coal, but also that coal was now economically viable for new uses, which ultimately greatly [increased coal consumption (B)]
That is presented as a chain of events. Let’s take them as being linear and points A and B represent “data points” along that line. For illustrative purposes, let me add more possible points, C and D, along that line, sort of projecting a later possible point and an even more “ultimate point”:
the new efficient steam engine initially [decreased coal consumption (A)] which led to a drop in the price of coal. This meant not only that more people could afford coal, but also that coal was now economically viable for new uses, which ultimately greatly [increased coal consumption (B)], which has led/will ultimately lead to a decreased supply of coal as the resource was/is being exhausted, and then finally [decreased consumption (C)] or even no consumption as the resource will have ["disappeared" (D)].
In yours and Jevon’s arguments, you stop at point B and say, “See, I told you increased efficiency increases consumption!” But why not stop at points A, C, or D—the points at which consumption decreased or will likely ultimately decrease? IMO, you likely have a bias at stopping at B because you already seem to believe that your unproven premise efficiency-increases-consumption is always or at least often “true” just as a person with the opposite bias might stop at A or C and say, "See, I told you efficiency decreases consumption!" But
all those points might be valid stopping points, and yet
invalid depending.
Let me postulate "Idea 1": Along a chain or cycle or pathway of events, one could probably stop at various points without going further in either direction and one could probably make a decent argument for stopping at those points, if they are indeed actual points to be stopped at. That would, however, likely not illustrate the whole picture, so stopping like that is probably not a very accurate thing to do, especially if one wants to make a firm
predictive statement involving the
whole pathway and yet only focuses on
part of that pathway.
The engine/coal pathway I expanded above could also not reach D (at least not so early), but could keep going back and forth based on repeated changes in supply and demand, till an ultimate point X or whatever. There could be more points of increased and decreased consumption added along that path. But Idea 1 would probably still apply.
Note that I haven’t "proved" Idea 1 is universally "true," I just stated it because I think it’s prudent to recognize the potential willy-nillyness of choosing convenient data points that suit a particular argument and ignoring the data points that might not suit that particular argument. I think this is an illustration of the fallacy in using “positive confirmation.”
As I’ve tried to show in previous posts, I think it's likely that increased efficiency can decrease and increase consumption at varying times and to varying degrees and in varying ways, depending on how one looks at the whole consumption process, and depending on the specific nature of the process and goods in question. Again, note that those two quoted sentences above about increased engine efficiency driving coal prices lower include both INCREASED and DECREASED coal consumptions as effects along that linear pathway. Are all data points equally important to stop at, are some more important than others, do some have no importance or relatively little importance? Again, that likely depends on what you’re specifically trying to figure out and show, but they are all still a part of the full picture.
One probably shouldn’t “absolutely” say and/or assume “increased efficiency will increase consumption” because while that might have been and might be true in some situations at some specific points in time (like the engine/coal example above possibly), it’s only one part of the “truth.” It’s likely not the whole truth.
Fran (who woke up with a headache today, ugghh....)
, but you and the references you've pointed out have not proved these two following things, at least not to my nitpicky satisfaction apparently: 1) that conservation will stimulate economic growth and 2) that improved efficiency will stimulate economic growth. Those have been part of your premises. Conservation and improved efficiency 
? I think you can guess correctly whether I believe in infinite growth's existence and feasibility....
