[lawnchair]

While we're on the topic, it is possible to get from natural Uranium to bomb using a CANDU style reactor fueled with unenriched Uranium. That's how India built its first test device (Smiling Buddha, 1974) from a CANDU-related reactor. India's later bombs are probably from their reversed-engineered CANDU-type reactors. The trick is to irridate U-238 for a short while, to build up Pu-239 but not so much Pu-240. CANDU makes that relatively easy, since fuel elements can be changed while the reactor is operation.

For that matter, the US Trinity and Nagasaki bombs did not require enriching Uranium at any step... the Hanford reactors were graphite-moderated natural-U. This is important to note. If, say, Iran were to seek or create enough heavy water for a CANDU type reactor, it would draw lots of notice. Enough graphite... not nearly so suspicious.

Centrifuges, though, would produce enough enough highly enriched Uranium to make a bomb with much less engineering expertise. If you wanted a N.K.-style test to say "Here we are", that's probably the best route.

In any event, Canada could have a bomb within months if interested.

[Tanada]

While we're on the topic, it is possible to get from natural Uranium to bomb using a CANDU style reactor fueled with unenriched Uranium. That's how India built its first test device (Smiling Buddha, 1974) from a CANDU-related reactor. India's later bombs are probably from their reversed-engineered CANDU-type reactors. The trick is to irridate U-238 for a short while, to build up Pu-239 but not so much Pu-240. CANDU makes that relatively easy, since fuel elements can be changed while the reactor is operation.

For that matter, the US Trinity and Nagasaki bombs did not require enriching Uranium at any step... the Hanford reactors were graphite-moderated natural-U. This is important to note. If, say, Iran were to seek or create enough heavy water for a CANDU type reactor, it would draw lots of notice. Enough graphite... not nearly so suspicious.

Centrifuges, though, would produce enough enough highly enriched Uranium to make a bomb with much less engineering expertise. If you wanted a N.K.-style test to say "Here we are", that's probably the best route.

In any event, Canada could have a bomb within months if interested.

Hell if I were Iran and I wanted to go the plutonium route I would build something resembling a CANDU reactor but I would substitute petroleum for the heavy water. Beleive it or not heavy oil is a decent moderator for neutrons, it has both the hydrogen of water and the carbon of graphite. You need a large structure because it isn't quite as effective as heavy water so the neutrons need more volume to pass through before they strike another fuel bundle, but that really isn't a big deal to a country exporting millions of barrels of oil every day of the week. A hundred thousand barrels would be far more than you would need.

Actually personally I think President Amadinajad wants to percipitate the islamic version of the arrival of the Messiah and that is the real reason for all this song and dance. Any group or country with nuclear power and the abillity to reprocess can make an arbitraliy large number of fission weapons over the course of a few years with sufficient investment of manpower, money, and equipment. If he wanted to keep his options open he would have agreed to letting Russia enrich all his uranium and contracted someone like France or the UK to reprocess his spent fuel and return all the products to Iran.

Only one 'waste product' from spent fuel is really of concern. It is not Plutonium or Uranium, it is often chemically seperated in pure form and it is suitible for use as fast reactor fuel....or fission bombs.

[Twilight]

If he wanted to keep his options open he would have agreed to letting Russia enrich all his uranium and contracted someone like France or the UK to reprocess his spent fuel and return all the products to Iran.

Would you be happy if Russia was doing all your refining for you?

[Free]

The reactions of USrael make it clear that the bluff is called (interestingly enough probably with a bluff) and that they fold.

I think we can scrap all the "Iran will be attacked" threads. Not gonna happen, and they know it.

[Tanada]

If he wanted to keep his options open he would have agreed to letting Russia enrich all his uranium and contracted someone like France or the UK to reprocess his spent fuel and return all the products to Iran.

Would you be happy if Russia was doing all your refining for you?

If Russia were the only possible supplier I could buy from then emphatically NO! In the case of Iran and reactor fuel however, their is a global market and they could have bought from Japan, Korea, China, India, France, the UK or Russia and nobody would have batted an eye. Russia made the offer as a last ditch effort to head off the current dispute, but so far as I have been able to determine from news searches Iran never sought Uranium reactor fuel on the world market before setting off down this road.


That is what I mean when I say they are seeking conflict, quite a few nuclear power consuming countries (Argentina and Romania come to mind) buy their fuel on the open market just like you would buy Petroleum or Coal. If they really wanted fission power plants and just fission power plants they could have built all they needed and purchased and stored all the fresh fuel they would need for the plants operational lifetimes as well in a moderately sized warehouse.

[Newsseeker]

There probably will be no attack but Iran sure enjoys playing brinksmanship and giving people reasons to attack.

[EnergyUnlimited]

If he wanted to keep his options open he would have agreed to letting Russia enrich all his uranium and contracted someone like France or the UK to reprocess his spent fuel and return all the products to Iran.

Would you be happy if Russia was doing all your refining for you?

If Russia were the only possible supplier I could buy from then emphatically NO! In the case of Iran and reactor fuel however, their is a global market and they could have bought from Japan, Korea, China, India, France, the UK or Russia and nobody would have batted an eye. Russia made the offer as a last ditch effort to head off the current dispute, but so far as I have been able to determine from news searches Iran never sought Uranium reactor fuel on the world market before setting off down this road.


That is what I mean when I say they are seeking conflict, quite a few nuclear power consuming countries (Argentina and Romania come to mind) buy their fuel on the open market just like you would buy Petroleum or Coal. If they really wanted fission power plants and just fission power plants they could have built all they needed and purchased and stored all the fresh fuel they would need for the plants operational lifetimes as well in a moderately sized warehouse.

Energy independence is a national security issue.
Why Iran should rely on foreign manufacturers of nuclear fuel, especially if they have their own uranium ores?
It is easy to realise, that should world go nuclear in frantic attempts to postpone inevitable there will be not enough of fuel for all.
In any case any nation with several npp operated for some years will have enough plutonium in their spent fuel, that if they deem it necessary, they will develope atomic warheads within one year albeit design will be primitive (Fat Man alike).
They will make first test explosion before world fully realise, what they are up to.
BTW reactor grade plutonium is good for nukes too!
Nations like Japan, Brasil, Germany or Switzerland would probably have their first nuke within several weeks, should they decided to convert into weapons state.
I wonder why peoples cannot accept, that nuclear proliferation in the future is simply inevitable if nuclear energy sector is to be scaled up worldwide.
It would be only up to good will of particular states not to develope weapons under that scenario.

[EnergyUnlimited]

Only one 'waste product' from spent fuel is really of concern. It is not Plutonium or Uranium, it is often chemically seperated in pure form and it is suitible for use as fast reactor fuel....or fission bombs.

Sounds a bit enigmatic, but you are probably thinking about 237-Np.
Neptunium bomb would require about 90kg of that isotope without reflector and 40kg with reflector.
Neptunium is also nice to work with (far nicer than plutonium would be) and it is also suitable for Little Boy alike "gun design", which a clever individual with some engineering skills could assemble in his basement.

However realistically you can expect about one neptunium bomb for each 1GW reactor operated for 1 year.
Your arsenal would build up slowly...

[Twilight]

However realistically you can expect about one neptunium bomb for each 1GW reactor operated for 1 year.
Your arsenal would build up slowly...

Might as well go out in style. That would be like using gold bullets.

[Rock_solid_bacon]

Kind of strange to have Bloomberg website to have typo of date indicated in the article. I felt that this article had been penned in by a coffee laden doomer...

There aren't any coffee laden Doomers on this site, are there?

[Rock_solid_bacon]

Don;t worry about Neptunium bombs. It aint happening, just another stupid media story they were told to write about for some unknown reason, to distract us.

[Tanada]

Only one 'waste product' from spent fuel is really of concern. It is not Plutonium or Uranium, it is often chemically seperated in pure form and it is suitible for use as fast reactor fuel....or fission bombs.

Sounds a bit enigmatic, but you are probably thinking about 237-Np.
Neptunium bomb would require about 90kg of that isotope without reflector and 40kg with reflector.
Neptunium is also nice to work with (far nicer than plutonium would be) and it is also suitable for Little Boy alike "gun design", which a clever individual with some engineering skills could assemble in his basement.

However realistically you can expect about one neptunium bomb for each 1GW reactor operated for 1 year.
Your arsenal would build up slowly...

Ding ding ding Give that poster a prize! My data indicate on average you can recover 522g/Mg from spent fuel, and assuming your average reactor discharges on the order of 25 tons per year that will yield you about 13 kg Np-237. With a modern implosion design that would get you at least 2 and possibly as many as 4 warheads assuming you were smart enough to use the recovered Uranium as the tamper/reflector in the design.

It takes about 60 bare kg of Np-237 to create a critical mass, for a reflected mass it is about 24 and with 4X compression (sophisticated implosion design) it takes about 6 kg. Add a booster charge and you can quadruple the yield per mass ratio.

Neptunium WMD

A full-controlled criticality of the element neptunium was achieved in late September 2002 at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Technical Area 18 using a six kilogram nickel-clad neptunium sphere in combination with approximately 60 kilograms of enriched uranium. Scientists now know it takes about 30 percent less neptunium than previously thought, or about 60 kilograms, to generate a nuclear chain reaction.

The isotope of neptunium used in this first criticality experiment was neptunium-237. The element has other isotopes that are very short lived, but neptunium-237 has an extraordinary long half-life of two million years. The International Atomic Energy Agency approved monitoring neptunium in 1999.

The experiment was conducted using the "Planet" assembly device at the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility or LACEF. The neptunium and enriched uranium assembly was constructed at TA-18's Critical Assembly and Storage Area-One, and mounted on the "Planet" device. The actual criticality was controlled remotely to assure the safety and security of the experiment.

The experiment yielded preliminary data that show the critical mass of neptunium is actually less than previously predicted. Following additional experimentation, the data will eventually pinpoint the element's exact critical mass, something that has not been determined before in the United States. Lab scientists used neptunium-237, the most stable of 20 isotopes, or variations, of neptunium with a half-life of about 2 million years.

Prior to this experiment, the critical mass of neptunium was only estimated with computer models from data based on earlier experiments using much smaller amounts of the element in less than optimal configurations. "The results of this experiment are of interest to scientists working in the fields of nuclear safeguards, nuclear nonproliferation and criticality safety," said Steve Clement of the Laboratory's Advanced Nuclear Technology group, part of the Nonproliferation and International Security Division. "While the actual criticality was achieved in about four days, this experiment has been in the works for 12 years, so on many levels, it's a major accomplishment."

[Tanada]

Don;t worry about Neptunium bombs. It aint happening, just another stupid media story they were told to write about for some unknown reason, to distract us.

Not so, read LANL report

Neptunium Criticality
Achieved
Kevin Roark, [email protected]
(505) 665-0582 (02-118)
A full-controlled criticality of the
element neptunium was achieved in
late September at Los Alamos
National Laboratory's Technical
Area 18 using a six kilogram
nickel-clad neptunium sphere in
combination with approximately 60
kilograms of enriched uranium.
The experiment was conducted
using the "Planet" assembly device
at the Los Alamos Critical
Experiments Facility or LACEF.
The neptunium and enriched
uranium assembly was constructed
at TA-18's Critical Assembly and
Storage Area-One, and mounted on
the "Planet" device. The actual
criticality was controlled remotely
to assure the safety and security of
the experiment.
The experiment has yielded
preliminary data that show the
critical mass of neptunium is
actually less than previously
predicted. Following additional
experimentation, the data will
eventually pinpoint the element's
exact critical mass, something that
has not been determined before in
the United States.
Neptunium is an element produced
as a by-product of nuclear power
generation. Prior to this
experiment, the critical mass of
neptunium was only estimated with
computer models from data based
on earlier experiments using much
smaller amounts of the element in
less than optimal configurations.
"The results of this experiment are
of interest to scientists working in
the fields of nuclear safeguards,
nuclear nonproliferation and
criticality safety," said Steve
Clement of the Laboratory's
Advanced Nuclear Technology
group, part of the Nonproliferation
and International Security Division.
"While the actual criticality was
achieved in about four days, this
experiment has been in the works
for 12 years, so on many levels, it's
a major accomplishment."
Neptunium is a man-made actinide
metal, grayish in color, which lies
on the periodic table of elements
between uranium and plutonium.
The isotope of neptunium used in
this first criticality experiment was
neptunium-237. The element has
other isotopes that are very short
lived, but neptunium-237 has an
extraordinary long half-life of two
million years. The International
Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (2002-2003)
Officers
Chair: Michaele Brady-Rapp, [email protected]
Vice Chair: James Baker, [email protected]
Secretary: Kevin Reynolds, [email protected]
Treasurer: Christa Reed, [email protected]
Executive Committee and Committee Chairs
2003 Jerry McKamy, Membership, [email protected]
2003 Lon Paulson, Education [email protected]
2003 Valerie Putman, Honors and Awards, [email protected]
2004 Mark DeHart, Program Committee, [email protected]
2004 Paul Felsher, Publications, [email protected]
2004 Chris Robinson, [email protected]
2005 James Felty, [email protected]
2005 Keyes Niemer, [email protected]
2005 Bonnie Rumble, [email protected]
Nuclear Criticality Safety Division Newsletter
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Atomic Energy Agency approved
monitoring neptunium in 1999.
Rene Sanchez and David Loaiza,
both of Advanced Nuclear
Technology, were primarily
responsible for the successful
criticality, along with a team that
included Clement, Robert
Kimpland, David Hayes, Peter
Jaegers, Charlene Cappiello, Bill
Myers, Ken Butterfield, Charles
Hollas, Charles Goulding, Joetta
Goda, Eric Sorensen and a support
team of special nuclear materials
custodians and others.
"Fabrication of the sphere was
completed about 18 months ago
here at Los Alamos," said Sanchez.
"Since then we've been in planning,
getting permission from the
Department of Energy to do the
experiment and taking care of
security issues. Once all that was
in place, it took about four days to
do the technical operations of the
experiment. It could not have been
accomplished without the hard
work and determination of the
whole team, NIS management and
the NNSA Office of Los Alamos
Site Operations."
"After working together as a team
for so many years doing something
and wondering 'Is it ever going to
happen?' it was such a great feeling
to actually bring it together," said
Loaiza. "The people here at TA-18
are just amazing, excellent people."
The work was done to support the
DOE's Criticality Safety Program
and the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Nonproliferation
Program and Emergency Response
Program.
So-called "bare" criticality is
achieved when sufficient mass of
fissile material is present to sustain
a nuclear chain reaction without
any reflective materials. The
neptunium criticality was achieved
in a "low power" state, where the
overall radioactivity is kept
relatively low, at about 300
millirem per hour, and no
significant heat or fission
byproducts are created.
Since the neptunium sphere alone
was not of sufficient mass to
sustain the nuclear reaction, it was
placed in the center of several thin
nested shells of enriched uranium
configured in an upper and lower
half, with the neptunium sphere
located in the lower section. The
uranium in this case helps drive the
system aiding in the neptunium's
ability to sustain the chain reaction.
The two halves of the assembly
were placed in the "Planet" device,
one half above the other, a safe
distance apart. During the
experiment, measurements are
taken as the lower section is raised
and brought closer and closer to the
upper section until sufficient mass
of fissile materials is present and
criticality is achieved. Since the
reactivity of enriched uranium is
well established the critical mass of
neptunium can be readily
calculated from the experiment's
resultant data.
"LACEF is the only operational
general purpose critical mass
laboratory in the Western
Hemisphere. It is the only facility
in the United States where this kind
of experiment could be done," said
Clement.
The team plans to continue with
further experiments using a variety
of reflecting materials. This will
enable the scientists to determine
the critical mass of neptunium
under a variety of conditions, as
that mass can vary depending on
the amount of neutrons reflected or
absorbed by materials surrounding
the nuclear material.
The nickel-clad neptunuim sphere is
shown resting in the lower half of the
assembly surrounded by the shells of
enriched uranium that make up the
upper half of the experiment. Photo
Credit: Los Alamos National
Laboratory

[KevO]

tick tock etc

International efforts to halt Iran's uranium enrichment programme have been "overtaken by events", the head of the UN's nuclear agency has said.

IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei said Tehran now possessed "the knowledge about how to enrich".

In an interview with the New York Times, he said the focus should now be on trying to stop Iran from going to industrial-scale production.

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed that Iran has solved its technical problems and is now capable of making fuel suitable for nuclear reactors.

"From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that's a fact," Mr ElBaradei said.

The findings come after a short-notice inspection by the agency at Iran's main nuclear facility at Natanz on Sunday.

"From a proliferation perspective, the fact of the matter is that one of the purposes of suspension - keeping them from getting the knowledge - has been overtaken by events," Mr ElBaradei said.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle ... 657243.stm

[Twilight]

Dear god no!

Not... not...

Not knowledge!

[KevO]

Dear god no!

Not... not...

Not knowledge!

lol. yep

[billp]

The Nimitz left San Diego on April 2, 2007 to relieve or join the Eisenhower off Iran.

Where will the Nimitz be on April 2, 2008?

1 Back in San Diego
2 Cruising
3 on the bottom
4 vaporized

Let's all hope for peaceful settlement

[billp]

Us guys, of course, are working on peaceful settlement.

Thursday May 10, 2007 14:41

Pamela N. Phillips
NSA Chief FOIA Public Liaison Officer/DJ4
9800 Savage Road, Suite 6248
Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248
Telephone: (301) 688-6527
Fax: (301) 688-4762
Email: [email protected]

Ms phillips,

We enclose a page address containing a motion to void judgment in our visible 1997 NSA FOIA lawsuit.

The FBI Gilbert letter reveals that Sandia Labs, the FBI, and NSA withheld documents, without acknowledging their existence, requested under the FOIA/PA.

I'm hoping that Ms Becknell is successful at sending me these documents by May 25, 2007. If not, I can do another jury trial DEMAND FOIA/PA lawsuit at the DC circuit.

We really feel that we should get matter settled.

We ask for your help to get these unfortunate matters settled before they get worse.

Here's our settlement proposal:

1 We ask that NSA post on its website the documents requested in our 1997 FOIA lawsuit

What information was provided to Saddam Hussein exactly? Answers to this question are currently being sought in a lawsuit against NSA in New Mexico, which has asked to see "all Iranian messages and translations between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996". [7]

2 The FOIA allows monetary compensation for a successful lawsuit. Therefore, we ask for payment of $1,000 per docket entry line - of which there are currently 77 entries.

We ask that you forward by email our settlement proposal to those in power to settle.

Please give us an ack if you get this email.

Thanks in advance.

Bill and Art

Do you think this will work?

----- Original Message -----
From: foialo, foialo
To: bill payne
Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2007 7:03 AM
Subject: RE: void judgment in CIV NO 97 0266 SC/DJS


Received.

Pamela N. Phillips
Chief FOIA Public Liaison Officer
National Security Agency
(301) 688-6527

[Newsseeker]

Wonder what will happen with Iran?

[Smudger]

they should use Thorium