Optimistic Model

by **pup55** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 10:37:36

http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic9100.html
http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic9080.html
http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic9091.html

As it happens, I was working on an optimistic model that describes just this sort of scenario. This model is remarkably similar in peak date to the CERA model. Each of the optimistic values below have been cited in news stories in the past year as possible sources of new oil, but with little or no actual substantiation, but in this model, we imagine that all of the below are true: As with all of these models, this is for entertainment purposes only, and not intended as advice to go out into the country or something.

Here are the optimistic assumptions:

a. A new discovery is made in ANWR plus oil sands in the western US increase the US oil reserves to 200 GB, which is 10 times what they are right now.
b. Oil sands become economical, as claimed, and therefore Canada’s reserves increase from 16 gb to 200 gb.
c. Offshore technology improves and Mexico is able to drill an additional 100 gb to the east of Cantarell, as they have recently claimed in the news.
d. Another 100 gb is found in the Caspian, as thought by some optimists, and peace and honesty break out, allowing people to drill it.
e. 200 gb, another Saudi Arabia, is found somewhere in the vast land of Russia.
f. An additional 135 gb (doubling their currently known reserves) is found in Iraq, and peace breaks out, allowing people to drill it.
g. Saudi Arabia’s recent claim of an additional 200 gb is correct, bringing their “reserves” up to 461 gb.
h. Alan Bond’s claim of 100 gb net extractable from oil sands in Madagascar is correct.
i. China is found to have the equivalent of another Saudi Arabia in their Bohai field, 250 gb (they have recently claimed that this is true).
j. All of the above are able to be brought online in such a way as to allow capacity to be added without temporary shortages.

There are few more reasonable assumptions:
j. Based on the BP review data, the other nations that increased their production last year continue to do so at the same rate. Exception: Iraq only increases 10% per year instead of 50%.
k. The nations that are in depletion (based on their currently existing fields) also continue to do so at the same rate.
l. Consumption proceeds at the same rate as it now is, about 3.7% per year, and grows with net extraction improvements.
m. “reserves growth” happens at a rate of 2% a year, that is, reserves in all known fields magically increase by 2% per year.

The new reserves total is 1188+1485 gb or 2673 gb, which is about like the rosy scenario described by the USGS. In this model, the short-term forecast is that things go along pretty much like they are right now for another 10 years, until 2015. The Chinese will be happy to hear this. They can all buy cars, and drive them to work.

At the end of this 10 years, because of the growth in consumption, the fields really will go into net depletion, and at that point, the Verhulst curve takes over. The model is computed based on curve fit to cumulative production and also to match the 2015 data, while minimizing the error. This allows for some additional production growth, and peak, etc. like the rest of the models.

Discussion:

a. The peak of production occurs in 2026, at a level of about 61 gb/year. This is roughly twice as high as it is now. At that point, the global population is 8.2 billion, approximately.
b. The production numbers do, indeed, look kind of like a plateau for a few brief years. By 2036, 10 years after the production peak, they are still pumping about 56.5 gb per year, which is respectable.
c. There is a real problem after that, though. The downslope is really severe. In the 20 years following that, by 2056, they will lose 50% of their oil supply, and they will be at about what we are now, 30 gb/year, but with a global population of nearly 12 billion people. Sorry, but some of the Chinese are now going to have to walk to work.
d. You can calculate, if you want, the amount of investment it is going to take to expand production by another 30 gb per year. It takes about $15 per barrel in exploration and development costs (sometimes lower, sometimes higher) and the current refining capacity cost is about $6000 per bod capacity, so if my calculations are correct, the incremental 1165 gb of oil between now and 2026 will take an investment of approximately $17 trillion, which is about 1.6 years’ entire GDP of the USA. So, in rough terms, it will take 15 cents of every dollar we Americans earn, or get by speculating in real estate, for the next 20 years to pay for this all, unless somebody pushes it into the future by borrowing. Guess what is going to happen.
e. Lesson: the next time you see one of these optimistic forecasts, that says we have a lot of reserves and the peak will not happen until 2025 or so, you have to ask yourself one question: What does the downslope look like? Do you really want to live in a world of 12 billion people (and growing), and 30 gb/y of oil (and declining)?
f. Lesson #2: If you are 20 years old or so, all of this will happen in your lifetime, if this scenario is correct.
g. Lesson #3: Maybe we are better off having the peak now and getting it over with before the population gets even more out of hand.
h. Lesson #4: As long as consumption growth is allowed to continue at the current rate, the longer we wait, the harder the landing, even if we do somehow manage to find a lot more oil.
i. Lesson #5: 2025 might be interesting. All of those Chinese people, driving all of those cars to work, polluting the air, filling up the landfills with scrap materials, and then, somebody telling them they can’t drive anymore. What will their reaction be?

edit: typo in item e above

by **pup55** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 10:40:08

Code: Select all: n 0.775986877 qinf 4,261.02 t(1/2) 125.1322163 k 0.053273091

Code: Select all: year prod model 1900 0.20 1901 0.24 0.29 1902 0.27 0.30 1903 0.31 0.32 1904 0.35 0.34 1905 0.38 0.35 1906 0.42 0.37 1907 0.45 0.39 1908 0.49 0.42 1909 0.53 0.44 1910 0.56 0.46 1911 0.60 0.49 1912 0.64 0.51 1913 0.67 0.54 1914 0.71 0.57 1915 0.75 0.60 1916 0.78 0.64 1917 0.82 0.67 1918 0.85 0.71 1919 0.89 0.75 1920 0.93 0.79 1921 0.96 0.83 1922 1.00 0.87 1923 1.00 0.92 1924 1.29 0.97 1925 1.57 1.02 1926 1.86 1.08 1927 2.14 1.14 1928 2.43 1.20 1929 2.71 1.26 1930 3.00 1.33 1931 3.20 1.41 1932 3.40 1.48 1933 3.60 1.56 1934 3.80 1.65 1935 4.00 1.73 1936 4.20 1.83 1937 4.40 1.93 1938 4.60 2.03 1939 4.80 2.14 1940 5.00 2.25 1941 5.20 2.38 1942 5.40 2.50 1943 5.60 2.64 1944 5.80 2.78 1945 6.00 2.93 1946 6.20 3.08 1947 6.40 3.25 1948 6.60 3.42 1949 6.80 3.60 1950 7.00 3.79 1951 7.30 3.99 1952 7.60 4.21 1953 7.90 4.43 1954 8.20 4.66 1955 8.50 4.91 1956 8.80 5.16 1957 9.10 5.43 1958 9.40 5.72 1959 9.70 6.01 1960 10.00 6.33 1961 10.32 6.65 1962 10.64 7.00 1963 10.96 7.36 1964 11.29 7.74 1965 11.61 8.13 1966 12.62 8.54 1967 13.55 8.98 1968 14.76 9.43 1969 15.93 9.91 1970 17.54 10.40 1971 18.56 10.92 1972 19.59 11.46 1973 21.34 12.03 1974 21.40 12.61 1975 20.38 13.23 1976 22.05 13.87 1977 22.89 14.53 1978 23.12 15.23 1979 24.11 15.95 1980 22.98 16.70 1981 21.73 17.48 1982 20.91 18.28 1983 20.66 19.12 1984 21.05 19.98 1985 20.98 20.88 1986 22.07 21.80 1987 22.19 22.76 1988 23.05 23.74 1989 23.38 24.76 1990 23.90 25.80 1991 23.83 26.87 1992 24.01 27.97 1993 24.11 29.09 1994 24.50 30.24 1995 24.86 31.41 1996 25.51 32.60 1997 26.34 33.81 1998 26.86 35.04 1999 26.40 36.29 2000 27.36 37.55 2001 27.31 38.82 2002 27.17 40.09 2003 28.12 41.37 2004 29.29 42.64 2005 30.22 43.91 2006 31.36 45.18 2007 32.67 46.42 2008 34.19 47.65 2009 35.94 48.86 2010 37.97 50.04 2011 40.35 51.19 2012 43.15 52.29 2013 46.48 53.36 2014 50.48 54.37 2015 55.33 55.33 2016 56.23 2017 57.07 2018 57.83 2019 58.52 2020 59.14 2021 59.67 2022 60.11 2023 60.46 2024 60.73 2025 60.89 2026 60.97 2027 60.94 2028 60.82 2029 60.60 2030 60.28 2031 59.87 2032 59.36 2033 58.76 2034 58.07 2035 57.30 2036 56.45 2037 55.53 2038 54.53 2039 53.46 2040 52.34 2041 51.16 2042 49.93 2043 48.66 2044 47.35 2045 46.01 2046 44.65 2047 43.26 2048 41.86 2049 40.45 2050 39.04 2051 37.63 2052 36.23 2053 34.84 2054 33.46 2055 32.09 2056 30.76 2057 29.44 2058 28.15 2059 26.89 2060 25.66 2061 24.47 2062 23.31 2063 22.18 2064 21.10 2065 20.04 2066 19.03 2067 18.05 2068 17.12 2069 16.21 2070 15.35 2071 14.52 2072 13.73 2073 12.98 2074 12.26 2075 11.57 2076 10.91 2077 10.29 2078 9.70 2079 9.14 2080 8.60 2081 8.10 2082 7.62 2083 7.17 2084 6.74 2085 6.33

by **gnm** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 10:46:00

And as a result global CO2 levels rise beyond levels not seen since the Permian and the resulting massive climate shifts cause billions to be displaced from thier homes and severely impact global food production which then results in mass starvation.

Seriously is continuing to use a finite fossil fuel really a good idea? We found more Yay! is not going to fix the world for our grandchildren.

Short of fusion being viable soon (or possible a massive switch to fission) we really need to scale back!

-G

by **turmoil** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 11:09:00

i vote for now. it doesn't make sense to push our luck, even if we have a good twenty years to convert to hydrogen, or anything else that comes along. we are energy slobs.

also, if climate keeps shifting, we won't be able to produce as much food anyway, and we will have less water to drink due to increased evaporation. either oil will get us, or other things.

Another lesson: we stupid monkeys are like any other species. We will test the carrying capacity of the Earth, and find out what it is. But our technology, unless it is powered by renewable sources, will be useless. If we can get to 2050 without major disruption to civilization, i really hope that by then, our technology is worthy of continued use.

by **khebab** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 12:23:42

Here we go!

Figure 1

by **khebab** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 12:32:08

About the following assumption:

pup55 wrote:l. Consumption proceeds at the same rate as it now is, about 3.7% per year, and grows with net extraction improvements.

I checked the consumption data on the last BP review, the trend is quite linear:

Figure 2

Therefore, is an exponential growth model appropriate for consumption?

by **pup55** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 13:40:35

Thanks again, khebab, for the nice graph work.

The production growth curve I got was the result of extending out the production curves for the individual countries (except Iraq), based on last year's growth or decline rate, and taking the sum. So for growing countries, it is possible to grow exponentially, but for declining countries, it decreases asymtotically. That's why the increase looks more exponential. It actually will level off in the out-years to something around 8%, which is the rate of growth of the FSU and OPEC.

You can make the argument that at the moment, consumption is limted by production. If there were more oil, the Chinese would use it.

Now, you can also make the argument that consumption is not limited by production, and in fact is an even 3% or whatever, and that the gap between these two curves is the so-called "glut" that CERA is talking about, namely a surplus of productive capacity over and above normal consumption. On the other hand, an economist would argue that if this situation were to take place, prices would drop, and encourage fuel use, and discourage conservation, so the actual consumption would really be somewhere in between, so maybe this is right. The forum readers might think aboout this and comment.

Anyway, per your suggestion, if you use the 3% assumption for 10 years and then let the model take over, you get a delayed peak, back to 2033 at about 51.5 gb, and the decline curve is a little gentler, as we would expect. The 2063 production of about 30 gb is what it is today. Maybe the 13 billion people that are around at the time will find a way to be friendly and share.

The two models now illustrate the point we made above, which is, that the hardness or softness of the landing is pretty sensitive to the rate of growth of consumption.

Code: Select all: n 0.321264497 qinf 4,226.24 t(1/2) 127.245319 k 0.038317215

Code: Select all: year prod model 1900 0.20 1901 0.24 1.01 1902 0.27 1.05 1903 0.31 1.09 1904 0.35 1.13 1905 0.38 1.17 1906 0.42 1.22 1907 0.45 1.27 1908 0.49 1.31 1909 0.53 1.37 1910 0.56 1.42 1911 0.60 1.47 1912 0.64 1.53 1913 0.67 1.59 1914 0.71 1.65 1915 0.75 1.71 1916 0.78 1.78 1917 0.82 1.85 1918 0.85 1.92 1919 0.89 1.99 1920 0.93 2.07 1921 0.96 2.15 1922 1.00 2.23 1923 1.00 2.32 1924 1.29 2.40 1925 1.57 2.50 1926 1.86 2.59 1927 2.14 2.69 1928 2.43 2.79 1929 2.71 2.90 1930 3.00 3.01 1931 3.20 3.12 1932 3.40 3.24 1933 3.60 3.37 1934 3.80 3.49 1935 4.00 3.63 1936 4.20 3.76 1937 4.40 3.91 1938 4.60 4.05 1939 4.80 4.21 1940 5.00 4.36 1941 5.20 4.53 1942 5.40 4.70 1943 5.60 4.87 1944 5.80 5.06 1945 6.00 5.25 1946 6.20 5.44 1947 6.40 5.64 1948 6.60 5.85 1949 6.80 6.07 1950 7.00 6.29 1951 7.30 6.53 1952 7.60 6.77 1953 7.90 7.02 1954 8.20 7.27 1955 8.50 7.54 1956 8.80 7.81 1957 9.10 8.10 1958 9.40 8.39 1959 9.70 8.69 1960 10.00 9.01 1961 10.32 9.33 1962 10.64 9.66 1963 10.96 10.01 1964 11.29 10.36 1965 11.61 10.73 1966 12.62 11.11 1967 13.55 11.50 1968 14.76 11.90 1969 15.93 12.31 1970 17.54 12.74 1971 18.56 13.18 1972 19.59 13.63 1973 21.34 14.10 1974 21.40 14.58 1975 20.38 15.07 1976 22.05 15.57 1977 22.89 16.09 1978 23.12 16.62 1979 24.11 17.17 1980 22.98 17.73 1981 21.73 18.31 1982 20.91 18.90 1983 20.66 19.50 1984 21.05 20.12 1985 20.98 20.75 1986 22.07 21.39 1987 22.19 22.05 1988 23.05 22.72 1989 23.38 23.41 1990 23.90 24.11 1991 23.83 24.82 1992 24.01 25.54 1993 24.11 26.28 1994 24.50 27.03 1995 24.86 27.78 1996 25.51 28.55 1997 26.34 29.33 1998 26.86 30.12 1999 26.40 30.91 2000 27.36 31.71 2001 27.31 32.52 2002 27.17 33.33 2003 28.12 34.15 2004 29.29 34.97 2005 30.38 35.79 2006 31.50 36.61 2007 32.67 37.42 2008 33.88 38.24 2009 35.13 39.05 2010 36.43 39.85 2011 37.78 40.64 2012 39.18 41.42 2013 40.63 42.19 2014 42.13 42.95 2015 43.69 43.69 2016 44.41 2017 45.10 2018 45.78 2019 46.43 2020 47.05 2021 47.64 2022 48.19 2023 48.71 2024 49.20 2025 49.64 2026 50.04 2027 50.40 2028 50.71 2029 50.97 2030 51.18 2031 51.34 2032 51.44 2033 51.49 2034 51.48 2035 51.41 2036 51.29 2037 51.10 2038 50.86 2039 50.55 2040 50.19 2041 49.76 2042 49.28 2043 48.74 2044 48.14 2045 47.49 2046 46.78 2047 46.02 2048 45.21 2049 44.35 2050 43.45 2051 42.50 2052 41.52 2053 40.50 2054 39.45 2055 38.37 2056 37.26 2057 36.13 2058 34.99 2059 33.83 2060 32.66 2061 31.48 2062 30.30 2063 29.12 2064 27.94 2065 26.77 2066 25.61 2067 24.47 2068 23.34 2069 22.23 2070 21.14 2071 20.07 2072 19.03 2073 18.02 2074 17.04 2075 16.08 2076 15.16 2077 14.27 2078 13.42 2079 12.59 2080 11.81 2081 11.05 2082 10.33 2083 9.65 2084 9.00 2085 8.38

by **khebab** » Wed 22 Jun 2005, 14:04:22

Ok, I performed a similar estimation assuming a linear trend for consumption between now and 2015. The fit is applied without any constraints except that the data between 1963 and 1981 are removed. The estimation gives the following:

Code: Select all: SSE= 40.88 qinf= 4173 Gb: PO date= 2021.56+/- 1.40 PO value= 32.42+/- 0.58 Gb/year k= 0.04+/- 0.002 n= 2.45+/- 0.27 t_half= 2035.04+/- 0.80

Figure 3

The curve shift away from the data after 2009, the PO value is 32.42+/- 0.58 Gb/year (in 2021), the mid-point is 2035 which means that the curve is somewhat asymmetric.

Optimistic Model

Optimistic Model

Who is online