[aflatoxin]

Twilight:

Thanks for the spec sheet. I'm used to seeing 60 Hz units, which run at 3600 RPM instead of the 50 Hz models at 3000 rpm. These are also E turbines, most of the ones I've seen are FA's, which I think have a much higher pressure ratio, and higher horsepower.

At any rate, the brag about the DryLowNOx system, which reduces nasty NOx emissions to the atmosphere, should be clarified. The DLE system only works on NG. If the Kuwati's are concerned about air pollution, and elect to burn kero/diesel in their fancy new power station, the only way to reduce NOx emissions is with either steam or water injection. GE usually goes with water. These beauties will use about 40 pounds (8 gallons, ~30l) a second of very pure deionized water a second in order to achieve 42 ppm, about triple of what NG does. Without the water, 100-150 ppm is possible/likely.

Lets play fun with math:

120,000 barrels of kerosene a day, at 68.2% Carbon content, and a SG 0f .78 comes to 19.5 tons of kero a day, or ~48 tons of CO2 a day per unit, or 978 tons of CO2 a day for the 20 units.

(They might not be burning higrade kero in these, Maybe #6 or bunker fuel. Makes the CO2 and SO2 a lot higher. Anyways, back to class.....)

If they have the water to spare, a mere 400,000 gallons per unit a day, or 8 million gallons a day for the whole plant, then the NOx emissions might be 42 ppm.

Given that, NOx emissions from one of these gems will be about 160 pounds/hour, if the environmentally-minded Kuwati's wish to part with the drink. Friends, that translates to 696 tons of NOx a year per unit, or almost 14,000 tons a year for the plant. This makes a tasty 37,000 tons of concentrated nitric acid for the environment to enjoy.

If, however they choose to be stingy with the water, this goes up a bit. At 100 ppm of NOx.....

NOx emissions would be about 378 pounds/hour per unit, 1658 tons a year per unit, or about 33,000 tons a year total of NOx (90,000 tons of Nitric acid)

I can't guess about sulfur, depends on the fuel. They would most certainly never burn nasty, high sulfur fuel in these. If they chose to however, it would put the NOx emissions to shame. 100k tons a year of SO2 would not be hard to picture.

wheeze.

[Starvid]

Still, the Export Land Model, after wrangling about things like imports and exports, only tells us that oil will be more expensive on the world market, something we already knew.

I don't see the use of breaking out individual countries exports from total exports, or indeed from the total supply.

The way I see it, it's just not relevant to say "Kuwait will increase its domestic demand, hence exports will fall, pushing prices higher". It's true, sure, but it all becomes clearer and easier to understand if you just say "Kuwait will increase its demand, hence total global demand, and hence prices will rise".

Talking about imports and exports instead of global supply and demand just clouds the issue, in my opinion.

Or have I missed something profound? Please help me understand this.

[azreal60]

I guess starvid the important point your missing is the rate of price rise will hugely increase because of the exporting nations no longer exporting. As their demand increases, most of these nations will Stop exporting. Not just increase the price, but Stop. So it will basically accelerate the rate of price increase and eventual lack of product availability.

Remember, the orginal peak oil projections called for 2 percent decline rate world wide. The reason why this is that much more worrysome is because this increases the decline rate, makes it that much more choppy, and is on top of the already increased decline rate from advanced tech being used and causing fields to go down faster.

It's like going down a 8 percent slope and suddenly it increases to 10 to 16.

[Starvid]

I guess starvid the important point your missing is the rate of price rise will hugely increase because of the exporting nations no longer exporting. As their demand increases, most of these nations will Stop exporting. Not just increase the price, but Stop. So it will basically accelerate the rate of price increase and eventual lack of product availability.

But this is nothing new. We already know that demand will grow strongly, and it doesn't mean anything if this growth happens in an oil exporting country which then effectively stops exporting, or if the same growth happens in an already importing country. As oil is a fungible product, the effect will be exactly the same.

Remember, the orginal peak oil projections called for 2 percent decline rate world wide. The reason why this is that much more worrysome is because this increases the decline rate, makes it that much more choppy, and is on top of the already increased decline rate from advanced tech being used and causing fields to go down faster.

Well, the decline rate is unaffected. What happens is that the gap between supply and demand grows not only because of flat/falling supply, but also because of growing demand, inlcuding in oil exporting countries.

But we already knew that.

[MD]

Over a week ago I mentioned this, but the thread sank.

Now I have time to elaborate. Here is what I was referring to.

...

By the way, in that same release above, seems Qatar wants an aluminium smelter, although it's going for the full NG-fired CCGT setup. In practicality, that's an improvement on Dubai's ambitions, but that's still gas not arriving at a port near you.

...

This sort of thing replicated across the ME Gulf is going to wipe out any increase OPEC could credibly pull off.

EDIT: Again, I would like to know, can someone make an educated estimate for the rate at which this specific OCGT gear is going to burn liquids, and maybe a boe/d or something so we have an idea of how this compares to crude volumes? I know the refinery balance in the ME Gulf produces kerosene / jet fuel for export, so I am assuming that gigawatts'-worth of guaranteed new demand showing up in 13 months is not going to be negligible.

I'd just like to see booked and pending orders from all the major powerplant builders world-wide.

Going back ten years and forward as far as they know.

what a tale that would tell, I'm sure.

[Revi]

I loved the movie Children of Men. That seemed like a likely scenario. The rich are getting richer and the rest of us are going to be walking or getting around on small scooters if we're lucky.

[azreal60]

For the people wondering why moderators wheren't moderating this thread, did it occur to you no one sent a moderator who was actually online a PM? I mean, you do realize that to go thru all the threads generated all day, we would have to read this site at least 20 minutes out of every hour ALL DAY. If you see a thread like this one was that needs moderation, feel free to PM us.

Now, on topic, the basis of this idea is as simple as peak oil, and as deadly to a modern way of living. I explained this idea right after peak oil today to a co worker of mine, and it made very good sense in 2 paragraphs of speaking. Wish I could remember them, but it made sense.

So, who wants to take bets on which countries will cut off exports first?

[Twilight]

We already know that demand will grow strongly, and it doesn't mean anything if this growth happens in an oil exporting country which then effectively stops exporting, or if the same growth happens in an already importing country. As oil is a fungible product, the effect will be exactly the same.

But what effect will be exactly the same? World or country?

World oil production, yes, it will be declining at some rate. World oil supply/demand shortfall consequently will be increasing at some rate. That high level of detail is of limited practical use however, beyond saying that the world on aggregate has a problem.

Regional trade, no.

The problem is, averaged world statistics while interesting from an academic point of view, are not going to be what gets people excited. When a nation is demonstrably losing out at a multiple of the world average, that is what will make headlines - not the world picture, not for many years yet. Export Land tells you what shortage of foreign exchange or imported resources a specific country may suffer, and that gets political fast. It is detail that the general peak oil theory by itself does not provide. Peak oil is directly relevant of course, but because of its accumulated baggage and dry science, it will probably be a background reference once resource nationalism kicks off in earnest.

I think around 2010, the first Export Land effects from Mexico and Russia will be on the front page of the Guardian, and the global picture will still be absent except as a footnote or Comment. As with the global warming debate, people take an interest in their country's share first, the world picture second. That may be a sad comment on humanity and a poor survival strategy, but politics being what they are, I can say with confidence that is what we will see. This is why Export Land is important - it is the framework for those first self-interested discussions. In the news stakes, Mexico or Venezuela ending exports to the US, or Russia reducing exports to the EU, will beat a 3% world decline that year.

I don't see the use of breaking out individual countries exports from total exports, or indeed from the total supply.

Talking about imports and exports instead of global supply and demand just clouds the issue, in my opinion.

And so where geopolitical self-interest enters the picture, this in fact becomes the key question. Production, consumption and shortage can be summed, but their distribution will be politically and economically important.

I take it you to mean that some capital expenditure (on the polymer plant?) should tell us that some amount of petroleum will heretofore be diverted as a particular industrial feedstock (polymer) rather than remain an internationally traded commodity. Consequence is it is essentially lost to the markets? Is that the connection?

Yes, you could put it that way. Once a raw material exporter decides to go into a value-added product business domestically, it means someone else's value-added product business is deprived of the formerly exported raw material, and that other party no longer benefits from said addition of value. If on top of that the product is consumed domestically as well, it is lost to former consumers who no longer enjoy access, and it doesn't figure on shipping manifests any more. By way of example, this sheds light on one reason why there is no point building new refinery capacity in the US. Oil exporters would be doing themselves a favour, maximising revenue and creating high-value jobs, by refining at source and shipping the product.

It tells us what petroleum essentially disappears. from the system and is not measured by ship-counters and market weenies

Yes, it becomes oil the importers never see, and frankly the effect would play out even if world oil production did not immediately decline.

I'd just like to see booked and pending orders from all the major powerplant builders world-wide.

what a tale that would tell, I'm sure.

I agree, and that kind of data will have been assembled somewhere. No doubt those with a professional interest in the shaping of the future already study it.

[Twilight]

So, who wants to take bets on which countries will cut off exports first?

Go here and click the 'Source' tab. Scroll to the far right column: that's 2006 net exports in descending order. There is also 2000, 2004 and 2005 data.

As you can see, there are 43 net exporters, although many of them export relatively low volumes.

Someone else can do a full statistically sound analysis if they wish (I am sure a country-by-country projection will be published at TOD eventually), but I can point out a few things I see at a glance.

Vietnam (2008) and Egypt (2009) are the next oil exporting countries to become importers. Mexico (2014) will join them due to its exceptionally high decline rate, even though demand is flat.

There are also a few interesting cases:

The UK
For the historical perspective.

Saudi Arabia
Demand rising, but not a major factor compared to the possibility of Ghawar collapse.

Russia
Demand up 20.4% since 2000, 5.8% in last year of data
Production maxed, reserves depleted and a North Sea style 10% decline rate is likely
Exports will suffer the class-defining Export Land Effect of being crushed by up to 10% from above, and up to 5% from below. This of course depends on how resilient the Russian economy is to a potentially significant reduction in export revenue, but once the process begins, it could cease to be an exporter in under 10 years. I consider the likelyhood of demand destruction to be offset by the likelyhood of state intervention in the market out of long term strategic considerations.

Iran
Demand up 30% since 2000, 5% in last year of data.
Production up 10% since 2000, down 2% in last year of data, but the long-term trend is a far lower plateau around 3,700 kb/d since the early 1990s.
Exports will get eaten by demand growth, but Iran probably has up to 15 years of exporter status remaining, barring rapid production decline. There have been suggestions of <10 years, but they require a very bullish outlook on an economy in recession. Especially with petrol rationing underway, I call bullshit. It is even possible Iran's consumption will get capped like Syria's.

Venezuela
Demand up 20% since 2000, 3.4% in last year of data.
Production down 19% since 2000, 2.1% in last year of data.
Exports could continue for decades especially given how thick the stuff is, if it doesn't ramp up internal consumption.

Kuwait
Demand doubled in six years since 2000, up 18.2% in last year of data and while it may ease off, we know it will continue.
Production probably won't get any higher.
Exports could get eaten by this type of demand growth in a decade.

Most of the other exporters fall into one of two classes, I would call them Middle East (Other) or Africa.

The former is subject to a relatively weak Export Land effect as demand growth is starting from a low base; depletion should be the dominant force, so they should retain exporter status for 20+ years, albeit in steadily diminishing volumes. Even so, any exponential growth over a period of many years adds up.

The latter has near-zero demand, any localised growth being offset by widespread price-driven demand destruction. So long as stability permits, their elites will export everything they can and permit little consumption. There is no Export Land Effect in Africa, nor is it likely that one would ever arise, or be permitted to arise.

There are further special cases in the form of Norway, Denmark and the like.

It would be interesting to perform comparisons of different Export Lands, as it is clear that there are distinct categories with different characteristics. I would suggest countries of strategic significance such as the above, Middle East (Other) and Africa, excluding the aforementioned hotspots.

In the meantime, it is interesting to note that attention will be focused on a few specific places.

[Twilight]

Export Land Model - Russia



I have mentioned in various threads around here that Russia may be a special case, in that it is likely to become one of the first countries to exhibit the Export Land effect, but that the blow may be softened by an economic collapse. Over at TOD, one of the criticisms of the Export Land Model is that it does not allow for a dynamic economic environment with feedback effects, for example rising oil prices crippling domestic demand and increasing exports.

I thought this might be worth investigating.

I was surprised to find that Russia is unlikely to suffer significant demand destruction from economic turmoil.

I used the following data:

ASPO Newsletter #31 (July 2003)
Item 212 Country Assessment - Russia

BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007
FSU Oil Production 1965-1970
Russian Federation Oil Production 1985-2006
FSU Oil Consumption 1965-1970
Russian Federation Oil Consumption 1985-2006

US EIA IPM (current issue)
Russia Oil Production 1970-1985

Sadly the period 1970-1985 is a gap in reasonable quality Russian (not USSR) consumption data, but I found a linear ramp between available data points agreed with ASPO's figure for past production.

Production

I began by assuming 1% production growth to a peak in 2010, in line with BP expectations, then a 7% exponential decline commencing the following year, which basically replicates the ASPO model. As a check the cumulative production looks OK. This decline rate seems reasonable given Russia's long production history, advanced state of depletion and recent use of modern technology, the impact of which can be seen in the massive increase in production rate since 1999.

To create a demand (more accurately, consumption) projection, I split the curve into 3 parts.

Part 1 - Growth
Consumption growth of 5% from 2006 data to the 2010 production peak. This is in line with recent trends.

Part 2 - Decline
The name actually refers to what would be happening to production and exports from 2011 onwards. Consumption growth is assumed to have ceased from the onset of production decline, and it is assumed to remain flat until export volumes fall below consumption. A simplified way of looking at this is the crossover point past which exports no longer pay for domestic consumption.

Part 3 - Collapse

Looking back, around 1988 production and exports fell, but the fall in consumption lagged this event by a couple of years and commenced once exports fell below it. Once consumption fell, the rate broadly matched the production decline rate.

My projection essentially assumes that this behaviour would be repeated, and consumption would commence declining at 7% per year from this crossover point, around 2017.

Exports

This is simply the difference between production and consumption.

An interesting property

We all know that Russia was a basket case during the 1990s. But look at its oil consumption at that time. It hit a floor at around 2,600 kb/d. That is municipal heating and transport. Thousand-apartment complexes heated by fuel oil in winters down to -45 deg C, trains and shipping. It is demand that cannot be destroyed, and you can see how a total political and economic implosion followed by a long depression failed to make a dent. I admit I was slightly suprised by this, but there it is nonetheless, remarkable in its resilience. Given the communal nature of urban living arrangements (hence design of utilities) in most cities, even falling population levels could have limited impact. There is no reason to believe the future will be substantially different.

Therefore my final assumption is oil consumption cannot fall below 2,600 kb/d once it reaches that level, and it will remain there so long as adequate production capacity is available.

Note that Russia's economic "prosperity" will by 2010 have raised consumption to barely 30% above this minimum level. This is because relatively few people are participating in the current boom. Away from the bright lights, people are not driving much, the once oversized defence sector is not making a comeback, and a great deal of work is still done manually.

Export Land Effect

As there is little scope for reduction in domestic consumption, the expected 7% production decline rate will hit oil exports with a decline rate of 11-12%. An economic collapse will offer only limited savings, and although the export decline rate will shallow, it will resume its trajectory once the minimum consumption level is hit. Russia would be out of the export business within 17 years of peak. The later and higher the peak, the higher the eventual decline rate and the faster the erosion of export capacity.

Not long afterwards, around 2030, domestic oil production will cease to meet internal demand, but by then the state of the world will be such that we can take our speculation in any direction.

[Revi]

Export Land Effect By Twilight:

"As there is little scope for reduction in domestic consumption, the expected 7% production decline rate will hit oil exports with a decline rate of 11-12%. An economic collapse will offer only limited savings, and although the export decline rate will shallow, it will resume its trajectory once the minimum consumption level is hit. Russia would be out of the export business within 17 years of peak. The later and higher the peak, the higher the eventual decline rate and the faster the erosion of export capacity.

Not long afterwards, around 2030, domestic oil production will cease to meet internal demand, but by then the state of the world will be such that we can take our speculation in any direction."

Great... Sounds like The scenario in Children of Men, but with more mouths to feed. The Export Land Model puts this whole peak oil thing in even sharper focus. When I read it, it was like finding out about peak oil all over again.

[shortonoil]

Twilight said:

As there is little scope for reduction in domestic consumption, the expected 7% production decline rate will hit oil exports with a decline rate of 11-12%.

There is little in history to support this view. US oil consumption fell from 9.64 mb/d in 1970 to 8.13 mb/d in 1976. This was a decline of 15.7% over this six year period. During the same period Real GDP (GDP in chained 2000 dollars) increased from $3771.9 billion to $4540.9 billion. An increase of 20.4%. The huge efforts placed toward efficiency and conservation during this period paid off well. There is no reason that it can’t be done again, and this time maintained.

The western world will just have to forgo it’s ridiculous life style. It is not very rewarding anyway!

[joewp]

The Export Land Model in full swing in Saudi Arabia:

Saudi domestic oil consumption up 6.2pc in '06

24 August 2007
JEDDAH -- Saudi Arabia's domestic oil consumption last year went up by 6.2 per cent to 2 million barrels per day (bpd) from 1.89 million bpd in 2005 in the wake of economic boom, while its oil production for the international market declined by 2.3 per cent during the same period, according to the ŒBP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007' released recently.

Persian Gulf to world oil importers: Screw you, it's our oil first, we'll send you what's left.

If trends like this continue (and there's no reason to think they won't), we can expect the oil importers to be fighting over less oil at a higher price for the foreseeable future.

But we knew that already, didn't we?

[wisconsin_cur]

Twilight said:

As there is little scope for reduction in domestic consumption, the expected 7% production decline rate will hit oil exports with a decline rate of 11-12%.

There is little in history to support this view. US oil consumption fell from 9.64 mb/d in 1970 to 8.13 mb/d in 1976. This was a decline of 15.7% over this six year period. During the same period Real GDP (GDP in chained 2000 dollars) increased from $3771.9 billion to $4540.9 billion. An increase of 20.4%. The huge efforts placed toward efficiency and conservation during this period paid off well. There is no reason that it can’t be done again, and this time maintained.

The western world will just have to forgo it’s ridiculous life style. It is not very rewarding anyway!

I remember my parents' life back then. It was hand to mouth. It was not pleasant and, as you noted, it was only six years and it was only a decline of 16%. Imagine it dropped 7% a year and did not stop after six years but continued for 50 years.

We were not living a ridiculous lifestyle, we were the working poor. my parents worked full time (when they could get full time work) raised chickens, goats and had a large garden and we didn't know if we were going to (financially) make it through that time.

You can quote as many statistics as you like but there was real human suffering behind the growth of GDP and the decline we are facing is neither temporary nor gradual.

[Twilight]

Twilight said:

As there is little scope for reduction in domestic consumption, the expected 7% production decline rate will hit oil exports with a decline rate of 11-12%.

The huge efforts placed toward efficiency and conservation during this period paid off well. There is no reason that it can’t be done again, and this time maintained.

The western world will just have to forgo it’s ridiculous life style. It is not very rewarding anyway!

How the Western world adapts to the loss of the lifestyle to which is has become accustomed, indeed on which it has become dependent, I view as another issue. But that an amplified export decline rate will manifest itself in Russia, I believe to be indisputable. Remove the residual energy consumption of the mid-1990s from Russia's energy picture, especially in winter, and you get North Korea. Russia will exit the oil export business long before that happens. Although in view of ongoing demographic trends and urban depopulation, it is likely the relevant threshold will have dropped to around 2,000 kb/d by the time it comes into play next decade.

[eXpat]

Export land model in action! as for today, due to shortgages in petrol and gasoil Argentina has stopped exporting oil abroad till "situation goes back to normal", link, (I apologize, this is fresh news and I cannot find a link in english, this is from an Argentinian newspaper in spanish), basically there says that starting today, the gov, has halted exports for a period at discretion of the argentinian government, and has ordered that prices go back to those of 31 of October 2007.
Argentina is not by any stretch of imagination an important exporter, but how long till other countries follow suit?

[eXpat]

More on this, here i got an link in English from the Buenos Aires Herald link

[Twilight]

I think the price controls probably have something to do with their problem.

[eXpat]

I think the price controls probably have something to do with their problem.

I agree Twilight I think is a situation akin to the revolt of the teapots in China, but I don't have more information, even to especulate, regardless of the reason, I think we will see much much more of this in 2008. Only time will tell...