KaiserJeep wrote:
The CO and the officer who had the con at the time of the accident have flushed their careers away.
AIS Data and Map
Here is the minute-by-minute account of the ACX Crystal's journey and try and tease out what we can from it. Above you have the AIS data from what I believe covers the entire horrific event, and the ACX Crystal leaving the scene of the collision. Yes. LEAVING the scene, only to return an hour later. I'll get back to that. I believe this shows that 1) nobody was on the bridge of the Crystal and 2) "Iron Mike" was in controls for a full 15min *after* the collision; see item 1. There have been no reports that any distress call went out until after the ACX Crystal came back at 17:30Z, an hour after the collision.
Some people hate analogies, but here's one anyway. If you were in the driver seat of a self-driving car, hit another car, and your self-driving car kept driving along the road... how long would it take you to hit the off button? Well, it took the crew of the Crystal, who I'm positive were not on the bridge, 15 minutes to find the autopilot off button. Either they were very disoriented by the impact, or they weren't on the bridge to begin with, and had to get up to the bridge in order to shut down the autopilot.
... There is a 14 minute gap that I can't explain, did they turn off AIS?
From this time forward, regular updates keep coming in at 2-3min intervals. Speed and course changes seem to suggest they were looking for survivors or trying to otherwise assist.
Looks like a couple containers took a tumble
Former destroyer skipper Bryan McGrath gives his take on the situation:
... When I was in command, I had a monitor installed next to my bed that replicated one of the main command-and-control pictures available to my watch-standers. This monitor was a “God’s-eye view” straight down on my ship out to 8 nautical miles. My ship was in the center, and other ships in the area were represented by ship avatars which indicated both their direction of movement and their speed. When the bridge watch called and woke me up to report a nearby ship that would pass close enough to be of interest, I swiveled this monitor away from the wall and matched what they were telling me with what the “radar” picture was telling me. Virtually all the time, the stories matched. Now and then, I saw something in the radar picture that was not reflected in the narrative from the bridge and asked for clarification. On occasion, I was concerned with a conflict and shuffled up to the bridge to have a look for myself.
A common error is to mistake an overtaking situation and a crossing situation, as we see in the “overtaking” situation graphic above this paragraph. A ship being overtaken is the stand-on vessel and so maintains its course and speed. If the other ship involved is to its right side generally, the second ship may believe the situation to be a crossing situation — and since it is to the right, it would be the “stand on” vessel. Two ships believing they are equally the stand-on vessel is a recipe for disaster. Situations like this are compounded at night.
On occasion — again, because of the presence of humans in the decision loop — plainly obvious situations are misinterpreted because of confirmation bias: Anomalous information might not match the mental picture that a bridge watch-stander has developed, and is then ignored. A classic case of this happening was the October 1996 collision involving the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 72) and the USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55). Essentially, the Roosevelt “backed down” into the Leyte Gulf while, unbeknownst to the Leyte’s watch-standers, conducting engineering drills. The radar picture told a story of a massive aircraft carrier moving astern at a high rate of speed, but the mental picture of the bridge personnel on the Leyte — who did not know that such a maneuver was going to happen — disregarded what their system was telling them, and they failed to turn in sufficient time to avoid collision.
... Using formulas from the ABS source cited here, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) standard for the container ship involved in this collision appears to be approximately 2.5 nautical miles to stop (at 15 knots) and over a half mile turning radius. The 9000-ton destroyer in question is quite nimble comparatively, but our automobile-infused understanding of last second swerves or the power of anti-lock brakes simply fails in this context. Decisions to avoid collision must occur far earlier and at far greater distances than in an automobile, and the longer that decision is delayed, the fewer options for avoidance will exist. Without early action, all either ship can do is to try and minimize the angle of impact.
The names of the deceased: Gunner’s Mate Seaman Dakota Kyle Rigsby, 19, from Palmyra, Virginia; Yeoman 3rd Class Shingo Alexander Douglass, 25, from San Diego, California; Sonar Technician 3rd Class Ngoc T Truong Huynh, 25, from Oakville, Connecticut; Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class Noe Hernandez, 26, from Weslaco, Texas; Fire Controlman 2nd Class Carlos Victor Ganzon Sibayan, 23, from Chula Vista, California; Personnel Specialist 1st Class Xavier Alec Martin, 24, from Halethorpe, Maryland; and Fire Controlman 1st Class Gary Leo Rehm Jr., 37, from Elyria, Ohio.
vtsnowedin wrote:Ships on autopilot don't make sudden turns so the question is was the sudden turn by the container vessel an attempt to ram the destroyer or an attempt to avoid the collision. I expect it was the latter. The fact the radio room of the Fitzgerald was flooded may explain the delay in reporting the collision but I have to wonder why a combat vessel has all it's communications equipment in one room without any backups in another part of the ship.
Lots of questions but few answers as of now.
Subjectivist wrote:vtsnowedin wrote:Ships on autopilot don't make sudden turns so the question is was the sudden turn by the container vessel an attempt to ram the destroyer or an attempt to avoid the collision. I expect it was the latter. The fact the radio room of the Fitzgerald was flooded may explain the delay in reporting the collision but I have to wonder why a combat vessel has all it's communications equipment in one room without any backups in another part of the ship.
Lots of questions but few answers as of now.
A 'sharp turn' in a massive cargo ship is usually measured in kilometer size turning radii, not something you do to target a small maverable ship like a Destroyer.
Newfie wrote:VT the photographic evidence is pretty clear ......
....... The new story is totally consistent. Whatever happened the CS did NOT try to ram the Fitz. Even if it did the Fitz should never have put herself in that vulnerable position. Some one the Fitz messed up bad.
sparky wrote:.
@ cog
pointing out the basic idiocy of any military is not slander
anyone who has been in one know the truth of it
military need no brains ,
While serving I saw this sign in a base
"whatever is not ordered is forbidden "
The first collision could not possibly have happened until after they built the second one. Just saying.Cog wrote:Ships have been running into each other since we built the first one.
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