http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic9100.html
http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic9080.html
http://www.peakoil.com/fortopic9091.html
As it happens, I was working on an optimistic model that describes just this sort of scenario. This model is remarkably similar in peak date to the CERA model. Each of the optimistic values below have been cited in news stories in the past year as possible sources of new oil, but with little or no actual substantiation, but in this model, we imagine that all of the below are true: As with all of these models, this is for entertainment purposes only, and not intended as advice to go out into the country or something.
Here are the optimistic assumptions:
a. A new discovery is made in ANWR plus oil sands in the western US increase the US oil reserves to 200 GB, which is 10 times what they are right now.
b. Oil sands become economical, as claimed, and therefore Canada’s reserves increase from 16 gb to 200 gb.
c. Offshore technology improves and Mexico is able to drill an additional 100 gb to the east of Cantarell, as they have recently claimed in the news.
d. Another 100 gb is found in the Caspian, as thought by some optimists, and peace and honesty break out, allowing people to drill it.
e. 200 gb, another Saudi Arabia, is found somewhere in the vast land of Russia.
f. An additional 135 gb (doubling their currently known reserves) is found in Iraq, and peace breaks out, allowing people to drill it.
g. Saudi Arabia’s recent claim of an additional 200 gb is correct, bringing their “reserves” up to 461 gb.
h. Alan Bond’s claim of 100 gb net extractable from oil sands in Madagascar is correct.
i. China is found to have the equivalent of another Saudi Arabia in their Bohai field, 250 gb (they have recently claimed that this is true).
j. All of the above are able to be brought online in such a way as to allow capacity to be added without temporary shortages.
There are few more reasonable assumptions:
j. Based on the BP review data, the other nations that increased their production last year continue to do so at the same rate. Exception: Iraq only increases 10% per year instead of 50%.
k. The nations that are in depletion (based on their currently existing fields) also continue to do so at the same rate.
l. Consumption proceeds at the same rate as it now is, about 3.7% per year, and grows with net extraction improvements.
m. “reserves growth” happens at a rate of 2% a year, that is, reserves in all known fields magically increase by 2% per year.
The new reserves total is 1188+1485 gb or 2673 gb, which is about like the rosy scenario described by the USGS. In this model, the short-term forecast is that things go along pretty much like they are right now for another 10 years, until 2015. The Chinese will be happy to hear this. They can all buy cars, and drive them to work.
At the end of this 10 years, because of the growth in consumption, the fields really will go into net depletion, and at that point, the Verhulst curve takes over. The model is computed based on curve fit to cumulative production and also to match the 2015 data, while minimizing the error. This allows for some additional production growth, and peak, etc. like the rest of the models.
Discussion:
a. The peak of production occurs in 2026, at a level of about 61 gb/year. This is roughly twice as high as it is now. At that point, the global population is 8.2 billion, approximately.
b. The production numbers do, indeed, look kind of like a plateau for a few brief years. By 2036, 10 years after the production peak, they are still pumping about 56.5 gb per year, which is respectable.
c. There is a real problem after that, though. The downslope is really severe. In the 20 years following that, by 2056, they will lose 50% of their oil supply, and they will be at about what we are now, 30 gb/year, but with a global population of nearly 12 billion people. Sorry, but some of the Chinese are now going to have to walk to work.
d. You can calculate, if you want, the amount of investment it is going to take to expand production by another 30 gb per year. It takes about $15 per barrel in exploration and development costs (sometimes lower, sometimes higher) and the current refining capacity cost is about $6000 per bod capacity, so if my calculations are correct, the incremental 1165 gb of oil between now and 2026 will take an investment of approximately $17 trillion, which is about 1.6 years’ entire GDP of the USA. So, in rough terms, it will take 15 cents of every dollar we Americans earn, or get by speculating in real estate, for the next 20 years to pay for this all, unless somebody pushes it into the future by borrowing. Guess what is going to happen.
e. Lesson: the next time you see one of these optimistic forecasts, that says we have a lot of reserves and the peak will not happen until 2025 or so, you have to ask yourself one question: What does the downslope look like? Do you really want to live in a world of 12 billion people (and growing), and 30 gb/y of oil (and declining)?
f. Lesson #2: If you are 20 years old or so, all of this will happen in your lifetime, if this scenario is correct.
g. Lesson #3: Maybe we are better off having the peak now and getting it over with before the population gets even more out of hand.
h. Lesson #4: As long as consumption growth is allowed to continue at the current rate, the longer we wait, the harder the landing, even if we do somehow manage to find a lot more oil.
i. Lesson #5: 2025 might be interesting. All of those Chinese people, driving all of those cars to work, polluting the air, filling up the landfills with scrap materials, and then, somebody telling them they can’t drive anymore. What will their reaction be?
edit: typo in item e above