Find the Baker Institute report and taskforce team list, which advises the US government, here:
http://bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/studies/ ... tudy15.pdf
On page 2-3, quote:
For the most part, U.S. oil policy has relied on maintenance of free access to Middle East Gulf oil and free access for Gulf exports to world markets, relying heavily on military preparedness. The U.S. has forged a special relationship with certain key Middle East exporters that had an expressed interest in stable oil prices and, we assumed, would adjust their oil output to keep prices at levels that would neither discourage global economic growth nor fuel inflation. Taking this dependence a step further, the U.S. government has operated under the assumption that the national oil companies of these countries would make the investments needed to maintain enough surplus capacity to form a cushion against disruptions.
But recently, things have changed. These Gulf allies are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests increasingly at odds with America's stragegic considerations. They have become less inclined to lower oil prices in exchange for security of markets, and evidence suggests that adequate investment is not being made in a timely enough manner to increase production capacity in line with growing demands. The opening of new media outlets in the Middle East has also increased the likelihood that a linkage will emerge in the minds of citizens there between the U.S. alliance with Isreal and coorporation on oil prices. Moreover, a trend toward anti-Americanism could affect regional leaders' abilities to coorperate with the U.S. in the energy area. The resulting tight markets have increased U.S. and global vulnerability to disruption and provided adversaries undue potential influence over the price of oil. Iraq has become a key "swing" producer, posing a difficult situation for the U.S. government.
In the past, energy crises have appeared simply to fade away over time. Sometimes, as in the late 1970s and early 1980s, recession solved the problem by radically reducing global energy demand. At other times, additional capital marshaled technological improvements, reduced costs, and created new efficiencies on both the supply and demand sides, fostering complcency among policy makers. Government attention to energy issues tends to fade as prices fall. That complancency could be justified so long as surplus capacities existed. But in a world of energy capacity constraints, complacency could shakle the American economy for years to come. If it does not respond stragetically to the current energy situation, the U.S. risks perpetuating the unacceptable leverage of adversaries and leaving the country's economy vulnerable to disruptions and volatile energy prices.
For two decades, the United States has gone without serious energy policy. In the past, such complacency about energy could be justified because world supplies appeared to be indefinitely ample. The "myth of plenty" was reinforced by the enormous gains that were made as market forces were allowed to work, regulations and controls were eliminated, and energy prices fell in real terms across the world. These gains, in turn, allowed U.S. leaders - both Republican and Democratic - to take a minimalist approach supported by the comfort of consensus politics that reflect an avoidance of strategic choices. From the perspective of this task force, there is no escaping the fact that we are reaching the beginning of an extensive period of sporadic supply shortages and periodic price hikes in the U.S. and other parts of the world. This new situation requires a reevaluation of U.S. policy approaches.
And other interesting quotes available later in the document, including, despite the reports of Bush and Kerry in their conventions, that "U.S. energy independence is unattainable. Policy must therefore focus on increasing the number of energy suppliers, the kinds of energy consumed, and the efficiency with which energy is used." (page 5).
Let you read the rest.
Mark
