SeaGypsy wrote:You are suggesting a mass revolt in China. There are continuous local revolts going on, they mostly don't make the news. There is nothing modest about China's reform over the last 2 decades; the opposite description is apt: outlandish.
Nothing has changed to contradict the thesis in this thread. Inflation is eating any wage rises up before they happen in the first world, even in Australia (where I live currently and the government boasts of 'weathering the GFC better than any other'). Whereas Chinese workers continue to achieve increased buying power.
I am not trying to argue that China is swapping places with the USA. Peak oil is gashing holes into all of the world's economies as we speak. My point is that in the interim, before some serious systemic breakdown occurs, the wage playing field is set to be levelled. Levelled then downwards from there.
Middle class is unsustainable bubble anyway, US will lose its middle class, China will never achieve it. This is, as they say, a mathematical certainty.
So you are predicting real US wages will fall by 75%? And real Chinese wages to double/triple? All in the span of 8 years? I think that is highly unlikely.SeaGypsy wrote:Hanging onto this gap is too expensive. It is not going to happen.
Parity will be in this space.
I am going to guess that the meeting point will come before/ around 2020 and that it will be at around $200 a week in current $USD.
Fair point. But even just looking at median income, I find it highly unlikely it will fall to China's level. The worst recession in decades only knocked 7% off of median income. Your projections assume 10x that level of reduction. This source might be a bit more palatable to you:SeaGypsy wrote:Knock the top 20% of earners off the stats then redo the maths; it's already happening. (PS having a quick scan of the chart provided; I rate it's worth as toilet paper. I very much doubt the oil plateau we are on is going to last out the decade. Such predictions are based usually on EIA & other mainstream major energy pundit forcasts; almost in consensus here at peakoil.com held to be cornucopian fantasy reliant on re-definition of 'all liquids' & highly optimistic outcomes of current speculated plays. Reality is we are going to be seeing the downslope starting sooner than later. The dynamics are massive. I doubt my prediction will apply across the board, or that it is worth more than 10 cents at present/ just a subject open to discussion)
Bleak News for Americans' IncomeFrom 2000 to 2010, median income in the U.S. declined 7% after adjusting for inflation, according to Census data. That marks the worst 10-year performance in records going back to 1967. On average, the economists expect inflation-adjusted incomes to rise over the next decade, but the 5% projected gain isn't enough to reach prerecession levels.
"Standards of living in the U.S. will continue to decline as we deleverage and emerging markets take over as the growth engine of the global economy," says Julia Coronado of BNP Paribas. Incomes are being held down by persistently high unemployment and tepid economic growth, and the situation isn't expected to improve much in the foreseeable future.
Europe Is Importing More Oil Than the US
As much oil as the United States imports, the European Union imports more, although both spend the same portion of GDP, the EU GDP being slightly larger. And as high a portion of GDP as Europe and the US spend on oil, China, Japan and India spend higher, with India, the smallest GDP, spending the largest portion. China is already importing half as much oil as the US, with the figure represents 3.5 percent of GDP.
Chinese Economy through 2020China’s economic success is not unique and is part of the “Asian economic miracle.” China’s economic development model is still largely a replication of that adopted by other more advanced East Asian economies, in our view.
China is at a similar inflection point. According to the data compiled by Maddison, Japan and Korea reached the $7,000 level in the late 1960s and 1980s, respectively. Thus the Chinese economy is now at an inflection point similar to that in the Japanese economy 40 years ago (i.e., around 1969) and the Korean economy 20 years ago (i.e., around 1988). We find that beyond this inflection point, overall GDP growth tended to decelerate and inflation to accelerate in both Japan and Korea (exhibits 2 and 3).
Specifically, with regard to economic growth, while the 10-year average GDP growth rate for Japan during 1960-69 and Korea during 1979-88 was 10.4% and 10.0%, respectively, the rate in 1970-79 and 1989-1998 decelerated to 5.2% and 6.3%, respectively (exhibit 2).
Risks
Both Japanese and Korean economies were hit by serious crises in the decade after their economies crossed the inflection point. These experiences suggest that the future development for the Chinese economy over the coming decade will probably not be entirely “accident-free”.
The particular crisis experiences of Japan and Korea point to the vulnerability of the Chinese economy and the types of possible risks that could seriously destabilize the economy. There are two—an energy crisis or a financial crisis.
In view of China’s rising dependency on crude oil over the coming decade, a sharp increase in crude oil prices for a prolonged period of time could deal as large a negative impact on the Chinese economy as was the case for Japan duding the oil crisis in the mid-1970s. In fact, the oil crisis in the mid-1970s caused the Japanese economy to gear down on a permanent basis.
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