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Page added on November 29, 2013

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JODI, Canada and the IEA’s Position On Peak Oil

JODI, Canada and the IEA’s Position On Peak Oil thumbnail

The JODI data came out a few days ago. Below is JODI World Total C+C with EIA data used for countries not reporting to JODI. I use EIA data also for Venezuela and Iran because JODI uses data reported by these two countries which is political and inflated by about one million barrels per day by Iran and half a million barrels a day by Venezuela.

The data is in kb/d with the last data point September 2013.

JODI World Total

Notice that JODI has a new world high in July just like the EIA had but down 976,000 barrels per day from July to to September.

JODI has Non-OPEC at about 350,000 barrels below the peak in December 2012.

Jodi Non-OPEC

I don’t put much stock in the JODI data but I do find it interesting look at occasionally. And since it is usually almost two months ahead of the EIA data it does give me some idea of where production will be two months ahead of the EIA report.

Canada’s National Energy Board came out with Canada’s production of “Crude Oil and Equivalent” about a week ago. The data is in cubim meters per day so it must be converted to barrels per day. You may remember I posted a chart of their data about a month ago. Well they have lowered their expectations somewhat.

Canada NEB

The data after July is where they expect production to be. Apparently they are a little behind on their data gathering. And as you can see they have lowered their expectations somewhat since their report in October.

But now I must tell you about this, Peak Oil in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2013. It appears to be the IEA’s official position on peak oil and the effect LTO, (Light Tight Oil or Shale Oil), will have on the peak.  The text is from pages 447 and 448 of the report.

Spoiler alert: They are also peak oilers, but the peak, they believe, will be after 2035.

Has LTO resolved the debate about peak oil?

It has become fashionable to state that the shale gas and LTO revolutions in the United States have made the peak oil theory obsolete. Our point of view is that the basic arguments have not changed significantly. To understand why, it is useful to revisit the main peak oil argument, which is based on the observation that, for a given basin or country, the amount of oil found and the amount produced tend to follow a rising, peaking and then declining curve over time – known as a “Hubbert” curve. This is either because big fields tend to be found and produced first, followed by smaller fields as the basin matures, or because the cheapest fields are produced first and, as depletion sets in, costs increase (because of smaller, more complex fields) and the basin is outcompeted by other regions. This phenomenon has been observed in many countries (Laherrere, 2003). Where technology opens up a new set of resources that were not previously accessible (as with deepwater or LTO), there can be multiple Hubbert peaks, as each type of resource moves up and then down the curve.

The crux of the peak oil argument has been the assumption that these dynamics, which are well established empirically at the basin or country level, will also take place at the world level (an assumption that has not been vindicated by empirical facts so far). For the purposes of the peak oil argument, the advent of LTO (or other technology breakthroughs) may shift the overall peak in time, but it does not change the conclusion: once the peak is reached, decline inevitably follows rather quickly (and, given the amount of LTO resources compared to the total resources, it could be argued that the peak would be shifted by only a few years in any case).

It is this last assumption – that it is possible to transpose observe country or basin-level dynamics to the world level – that is open to serious doubt. In all the countries that have seen oil production peak, oil demand has continued to increase. This demand has been satisfied, where necessary, by imports from regions that were still pre-peak and therefore lower cost. At the world level since there is no possibility to import, demand has to be equal to supply. If supply is limited, price will rise, reducing demand (and increasing supply). This price mechanism is expected to lead to a long plateau, or slow decline, rather than the rapid decline observed on a country-by-country basis.

With the acceptance that demand is as important as geology and price is determining worldwide supply, it becomes clear that other factors can play a crucial role. One that has been emphasised in successive Outlooks is the role of government politics. Whether driven by the desire to tackle climate change, or simply to encourage efficient uses of resources, government politics have a large effect on future oil demand. This is illustrated by the policy-driven differences between the scenarios; where we see oil production peaks (as in the 450 Scenario) it is not because oil is becoming more difficult and more expensive to produce, but because demand decreases as a result of policy choices.

Taking into account the large amount of unconventional resources that becomes available as oil prices increase, in addition to the significant remaining conventional resources and the sizable potential for EOR in conventional fields, no peak occurs before the end of the projection period. (In peak language, the URR value that enters into the Hubbert equation is large enough to delay the peak until after 2035). This was already the case before LTO. It has not changed much with the arrival of LTO.

So that’s it, no peak until after 2035. I’m betting that date will be revised… and soon.

Peak Oil Barrel



6 Comments on "JODI, Canada and the IEA’s Position On Peak Oil"

  1. J-Gav on Fri, 29th Nov 2013 1:39 pm 

    I also believe that a revision of that 2035 date is coming, possibly before 2020. What with the redefinition of what oil is, misreporting of true reserves in several countries and misrepresentation of the real challenges, costs and risks involved in getting at these new sources, it may be that we’re at peak ‘net energy’ already.

  2. Beery on Fri, 29th Nov 2013 1:54 pm 

    “…In peak language, the URR value that enters into the Hubbert equation is large enough to delay the peak until after 2035…”

    So because it’s within the realms of possibility that the peak will not occur until after 2035, and because the IEA is desperate to have PO happen later at all costs, this extreme latest possibility becomes the IEA’s official prediction. LOL.

  3. Dave Thompson on Fri, 29th Nov 2013 3:59 pm 

    No mention of ERoRI.

  4. shortonoil on Fri, 29th Nov 2013 4:05 pm 

    In 2012 a gallon of conventional sweet, API 35.7 delivered 61,000 BTU to the end consumer.

    Mayan Heavy, API 21 – 53,300 BTU.

    Condensate form conventional crude production API >= 60, 53,400 BTU.

    SynCrude less than 10,000 BTU.

    Shale Oil less than 8,000 BTU.
    .
    .
    When discussing world crude production it is a good idea to take into consideration “which” crude!

  5. BillT on Sat, 30th Nov 2013 2:14 am 

    Yep, it is NET energy produced from ‘oil’ that counts and we passed that peak some years ago.

  6. edboyle on Sun, 1st Dec 2013 2:16 pm 

    interesting that thepeople are talking the same language exactly just arguing dates so this is mainstream. Waht’s 20 years? We’Re tak´lking the end of industrial civilization here. A Boeing costs a lot and without oil is a waste of cash but they are still selling lots of them. Roads and other such investments which are longterm as well are being made. So if conservbative govt. says 20 years this is like IPCC predictions on the ice melt(it’s going faster than predicted). Take it with a grain of salt and play it by ear.

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