There is also an update in the December 2004 newsletter (article #448):
Newsletter 48

Thanks Khebab.

So, yes, I see the same info being quoted on ASPO's Saudi Arabia update. Saudi's numbers show top output at 15mbpd. Al-Husseini confirms this is possible but laughs at "the 22mbpd projected by the EIA".

But the link I provide above at the EIA site shows 15mbpd in 2020, 16.3 in 2025. So I don't know if the EIA has since updated their numbers or if there are other numbers floating around.

The other curious thing is that in one paragraph ASPO tries to show how the Saudi’s reserves are too high. They then quote Al-Husseini’as “laughing at the 22mbpd” projection as proof that the reserves are overestimated. Unless I’m missing something, production rate does not necessarily have anything to do with the total reserves.

In recap:
Al-Husseini claims 260GB reserves. He claims 15mbpd is doable, for how long depends. 22mbpd isn’t realistic.
ASPO claims 180GB, then uses Al-Hussenini’s 22mbpd dismissal to backup their claim.

That’s not honest.

Futhermore, Al-Husseini specifically takes issue with the ASPO's lower reserve claims:



I’m starting to see why Lynch rails on Campbell as being overly pessimistic.

They reduced the amount expected from Saudi in the 2005 outlook. Older versions expected 22mb/d from Saudi. ASPO's selective quoting of Husseini is somewhat dishonest.

If Saudi Arabia's new reserve estimates are a lie, its a very well planned one: starting more than 18 months ago, in fact, when oil had yet to crack $50. I.e., not just before Katrina & Rita made the world wake to Peak Oil, but even before Ivan!

Last year, didn't Aramco announce that their OIP was actually closer to 1200 Gb? (I may be confused on what that number referred to; this ArabNews story from April 2004 says Al-Naimi meant proven reserves, but that's absurd.)

Is it plausible? Circa 1975, estimates of Saudi OIP were 500 Gb, with "proven" reserves of 160 Gb. Adding the 25 Gb produced to then, and that's a recovery rate of 35%

But maybe that's how it all hangs together. If Original OIP is now 1200, and proven reserves now 461, that implies 38% recovery.

It's also possible that the 1200 is OIP remaining - i.e. after subtracting the 100 Gb already extracted. In that case, total recovery should be 43% Take your pick...

Hmmm...


Also, check this out: It's not new - we were warned last year!
Washington Post, Dec 27, 2004:

I don't understand how Saudis could suddenly double their OIP whereas most OPEC members have just small increases:


Credit: Stuart Staniford (theoildrum.com)

There has been no major new discoveries in Saudi Arabia since the late 70s:



As FatherOfTwo pointed out, Saudis oil fields are extremely well managed and monitored so it's fairly possible that they could update their OIP due to an increase in knowledge and exploration on known fields. However, Simmons said that most of the reserve growth is on paper and few are based on appraisal wells. Is it the case for Saudis?

I understand that the URR is influenced by economic factors and can grow with the price of oil because more expensive recovery methods become economically viable. But, I don't think this is the case for the OIP which is based on knowledge and is therefore less sensitive to the price of oil.

Am I missing something?

The 1970s OOIP/OIIP estimate was 530Gb...Aramco now says 700Gb which implies a recovery rate of 50% for the 260Gb of proven reserves (+ ~100Gb cumulative production). An increase of 170Gb OOIP since then is not implausible. They hope to increase OOIP to 900Gb by 2025, which would add 100Gb to reserves at 50% RF (USGS estimates a bit under 100Gb yet to find) and add another 100Gb through increase in recovery factor and OIP in known feilds so thats probably where the 460Gb remaining claim comes from. This would probably be better described as a proved + probable + possible estimate...

I doubt that Al-Husseini would use the word unsustainable in a throw away meaning; I feel sure he meant in the medium term, at the most. That former article was in May last year, which I think was not long after he retired. The more recent article is from August this year. I don't know if he didn't feel able to speak freely in the earlier interview, but it's possible. That interview seem to hold wishes more than hard facts. Despite the fact that extensive exploration has been done in almost all of Saudi, he offered the hope that new finds could help swell reserves.

His "simple mathematics" in the earlier article appears to suggest a peak in 40 years, but only if demand doesn't rise. So even that optimistic view is pessimistic, if you think about it. It will still almost certainly hit most of us in our lifetimes.

Well Saudi Arabia is not that large that they would not have managed by not to have found all the elephants

If we look at the statements made by various Aramco, ex-Aramco and Saudi people i think they already have a quite high recovery factor. That this can be increased by a major amount (200 GB extra reserves) in the "nearby" future is doubtful however. I think it will be possible to reach around 12.5 mb/d, but not much more considering that when the Ghawar field is really starting its decline curve (parts are already declining i think) how will they be able to significantly (more then 2.5 mb/d) increase their production?

I also think we are focusing too much on Saudi Arabia, Russia is also very very important.

Simmons' Twilight in the Desert refers to a 1979 Senate Staff Report that gives a 110 billion barrel proven reserve number for Saudi Arabia. According to the EIA Saudi Arabia has produced 45 billion barrels from this date up to 2004. Furthermore new discoveries since 1979 are approximately 10 billion barrels according to Simmons. Thus remaining reserves could be estimated at 75 billion barrels hence this graph:



However the 1979 figure is most likely an overestimate; a result of the "silent lie" whereby the Middle East produces 28% of the world's oil yet hold 65% of the world's remaining reserves according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. The 1979 figures overestimates field reserves such as Ghawar's relative to production. Taking this into account the 110 figure is reduced to 80 hence remaining reserves in Saudi Arabia are just 45 billion barrels- a far cry from the claimed 260 billion barrel figure.

You are forgetting reserve growth in your calculation bobbyboy, thatmakes your calculation implausible. It is quite likely that due to reservoir estimates, enhanced oil recovery and other technologies reserves have been kept at 110 billion barrels.

It is also possible that due to these factors reserves have increasesd with another 50 or 100 billion or even more.

We do not have any information about reserve growth inside Saudi Arabia

If we look at Abqaiq for instance OIIP was 20 GB. Approximately 8 GB has been produced. Plotting a depletion curve as Lahherrerre has done gives a likely 12 GB ultimate recovery. This gives a recovery rate of 60%, maybe depletion will increase and only 10 GB will ultimately be recoverd. Still a recovery rate of 50%! that's quite high.

This gives some credibility to the Saudi Oil Miracle.

I suggest we talk about this on a field by field basis by the way.

Reserve growth? You mean something like this?



My understanding is that reserve growth is an illusion and world oil reserves peaked in 1979, the alleged reserve growth in "official" figures such as from the BP Statistical Review and the Oil & Gas Journal are "paper" barrels resulting from political actions from OPEC members in the 1980s etc.
According to Simmons' Twilight in the Desert reservoir estimation via computer modelling since 1979 has shown that the Saudi reservoirs are far more complex and heterogeneous than initially thought ( eg Arab D zone is fractured across the whole of Ghawar, Southern Uthmaniyah is far less porous than the northern part) meaning that previous OOIP and recoverable reserve estimates were optimistic.
As for enhanced oil recovery, Deffeyes in Beyond Oil stated that only CO2 injection has been shown to meaningfully increase recovery rates ( Marathon Oil estimates that in one of their fields in Texas it will increase RF from 30% to 40%), other EOR techniques such as gas reinjection, water flooding, horizontal drilling etc act like "superstraws" which either increase production temporarily such as Yibal in Oman for a steeper decline to occur later or only arrest decline rates temporaily doing nothing to increase URR or they can even damage the reservoir leading to a lower URR which is Simmons' worry in Saudi Arabia.
As for Abqaiq your figures agree with what I have stated eg 66% of URR produced thus far (8/12) is similar to Saudi Arabia as a whole (105/150).

I'm skeptical of the usefullness of the hubbert linearization applied to OPEC countries - their production has been demand driven since 1980 or so. OPEC production was as high as it is now in 1979. In any case, Aramco claims that only 130Gb of the 260Gb of reserves are developed, this is backed by the recently retired Al-Hussieni. The Hubbert linearization will only reflect the production of the developed reserves, if it works at all. Also keep in mind that Saudi fields are produced at low offtake/depletion rates, 1-3%/year for most fields. Shaybah was put online in 1998 at 500,000b/d from an 18Gb, depletion of 1%/year and would plateau at least 50 years at this rate, though its being bumped up to 800,000b/d soon. Compare to Prodhoe bay - 1.5mb/d from 13Gb at plateau. If they were really in trouble one would expect them to be draining the fields as fast as possible. In that case the 'super sucker' hysteria might actually have some basis in reality.

I know the graph you are quoting.

Lets look at the U.S. for instance the decline has not been very steep. Why?

"the growth of existing fields contributed about 90 percent of the additional U.S. reserves from 1978 through 1991"

I think this is a clear example that reserve growth does exist. Your quoted graph does not deny this, it is only backdated. That means that reserve growth is still there but added to the original date of discovery. If reserves grow more the Technical graph goes higher, it is not statical (which you assume) but dynamical.

You are stating on the premise of 2 examples, yibal and simmons his argument. And base the whole principal of EOR on these 2 examples. It is far more likely that sometimes EOR does not work in some fields then that these examples can be extrapolated to more then a thousand oil fields. If you have more examples (Cantarell probably?), like more then 20 i am more inclined to believe this theory.

Fact is that 3 mb/d at the moment are being produced with EOR techniques, fact is that there are not a lot of examples yet of this "supersucker" theory, only 1 or 2.

Another thing, what is the OIIP for saudi arabia then according to you? 700 according to the Saudi's.