by shallow sand » Fri 10 Jul 2015, 01:48:14
Syn asked that I post information that I posted on peakoilbarrel.com.
As you may or may not know, the office of the comptroller of the currency has loan guidelines for banks making loans to upstream oil and gas companies. Loans are in the form of a borrowing base, where the collateral consists primarily of the oil and gas assets.
I have been making a big deal about long term debt to PV10. The present value of the future cash flows of a company's oil and gas reserves, discounted at 10%, is a common method for valuing reserves for collateral purposes.
The OCC guidelines state that a range of 50%-65% of the discounted value of the company's future cash flows should be the maximum borrowing base determined by the bank, or bank consortium . Furthermore, PDP reserves which have been in production a minimum of six months are preferred, and if new PDP, PDNP or PUD reserves are included in determining borrowing base, they should be further discounted. Borrowing base is typically determined semi annually, also typically in the spring and the fall.
I realize that banks have price decks that differ from SEC PV10. I also realize that banks may not discount at 10%. I have heard 9% used due to historically low interest rates. Therefore, I am fully aware that bank's value determinations differ from SEC PV10.
I looked at the 2014 10K for the 16 US based publicly traded companies with rigs still drilling in the ND Bakken. PV10 for SEC purposes was calculated using a WTI oil price of $94.99 and gas price of $4.30. We know how much prices have fallen.
At least two companies disclosed what the price crash did to its companywide PV10. Continental Resources disclosed that utilizing pricing from 2/15 reduced PV10 all categories by 61%. Newfield Exploration disclosed that utilizing WTI of $60 and natural gas of $3.50 reduced PV10 all categories from $6.2 billion to $3.7 billion.
I took SEC PV10 all categories for those 16 US based public companies, divided by two and then calculated the long term debt to PV10 ratio for each, on a company wide basis. My assumption is that the first six month's pricing has cut PV10 by at least half.
XOM, of course, had the best long term debt to PV10 ratio, only 11%. Keep in mind, also, they are one of the few remaining integrated companies. They have tremendous cash generating assets besides upstream. In summary, they are rock solid.
The only two other companies with long term debt to PV10 ratios under 50% were EOG and Abraxas Petroleum. ConocoPhillips, Hess, Marathon Petroleum and Continental were all between 50-75%, with Continental likely now being above 75% given the company has added over $1 billion more long term debt in the first 4 months of 2015. A few other companies were in the 75%-99% range. The rest were over 100% long term debt to PV10, with two being over 200%.
My point is merely that low oil prices will cause massive write-downs at the end of 2015 and should cause large borrowing base redeterminations. As ROCKMAN states above, with the weakest companies, those redeterminations have already occurred.
I think it is noteworthy that as few as 3 of the 16 US based public companies in the ND Bakken would qualify under OCC guidelines to have all long term debt carried by banks. Keep in mind I used PV10 all categories, and only adjusted by 1/2 to take into account the price crash. I did not adjust further for PDNP or PUD, as the OCC guidelines indicate should be done.
Another poster at peakoilbarrel.com suggested substituting PDP PV10 for property, plant and equipment, which I found to be a great suggestion. If doing so causes net worth of the company to be negative, trouble is ahead without an increase in oil/gas prices. If PDPV10 is less than PP &E (less accumulated DD&A) value has not been created. It would be like building apartments for $400,000, that depreciate at $10,000 per year, but in year 5 only appraise for $250,000 instead of $350,000 or more, due to a low capitalization rate. With apartments, there is some time to wait out the economic downturn. With rapid decline shale oil, there is not.
Shale may tout recent efficiencies, but those are not enough to counter the combination of a tremendous price crash, prior inefficiencies, large borrowing, and high decline rates. These low prices could last several years. If they do, even names like Hess, ConocoPhillips and Marathon Oil could be in trouble.
I know I don't understand all the high finance stuff, but I do know our stripper wells produced 1/10 the net income the first six months of 2015 that they did in 2014. Thankfully, no debt repayment is required on our stuff. I am surprised there was any income at all. Several leases were underwater. Further, little CAPEX now will bite us in the butt later.
ConocoPhillips burned over $2 billion in the first 90 days of 2015. Many others burned 1/2 to 1 1/2 billion dollars. There is a lot of debt out there, and it is being added to now.
For some perspective, I looked at long term debt to PV10 for Whiting and Continental in 2003. Oil averaged $28 and gas averaged $4.80. Each had long term debt to PV10 in the 25-30% range. Now, with WTI of $50 and gas of $2.50, these ratios are in much worse shape. Whiting is over 100%.
On a final note, if you think oil cannot stay in this area for years, just look at gas. I was stunned that gas averaged $4.80 in 2003. We are in a commodity bear market, and the dollar is strong. We have sold oil for $8 and corn for $1.70. We didn't think those prices made sense, but that is the way it is with commodities.
The middle of the USA was booming the last ten years, except for about 8 months in 2008-2009. Now may be bust time.