Moderator: Pops



AirlinePilot wrote:I think its time we start talking seriously about this here at PO.com. I see it mentioned frequently but it appears that we hand wave it away at times. This IS likely the real bump coming in the road when it comes to the effects of PO. This link to the Wiki on the topic is a good primer and there is much info over at TOD on this topic.
Lately one of the members over at TOD (west texas) makes regular posts concerning this metric and what it means with regard to global declines and i will link his data routinely here in this thread. Other discussions are encouraged. I believe getting a handle on this particular aspect of the current global oil picture is very important in the search for where all this leads.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_Land_Model
Grautr wrote:The two examples I know of are Britain, which peaked in North Sea crude in 2000 and became a net importer by 2007.
Mexico peaked in 2005 and is due to begin importing in 2011.
The real blip will occur when this happens to SA.


Tanada wrote:Grautr wrote:The two examples I know of are Britain, which peaked in North Sea crude in 2000 and became a net importer by 2007.
Mexico peaked in 2005 and is due to begin importing in 2011.
The real blip will occur when this happens to SA.
Net importers can only be such as long as the aggregate net exporters are able to keep up the supply. SA won't be able to import unless there is enough supply to go around by then, which seems unlikely.





AirlinePilot wrote:EIA data show that Chindia's net oil imports increased at about 9%/year from 2005 to 2008, while (2005) top five net exports fell at about 2%/year from 2005 to 2008.
Over the 2005 to 2008 time frame, US net oil imports fell at 4.3%/year. All of this occurred as annual US oil prices went from $57 to $100.
So, to summarize, from 2005 to 2008:
Net oil exports went down, especially from the top five;
Oil prices went up;
US net oil imports went down;
Chindia's net oil imports went up.
JD, all but agrees with Brown on the principles of the model, he just unsuccessfully debunks the results as a "molehill". ANYTHING which can act to increase the total decline picture is something to be concerned about. I find it interesting that someone even tires to "debunk" this, its actually happening right in front of our faces.


AirlinePilot wrote: JD, all but agrees with Brown on the principles of the model, he just unsuccessfully debunks the results as a "molehill".
AirlinePilot wrote:ANYTHING which can act to increase the total decline picture is something to be concerned about. I find it interesting that someone even tires to "debunk" this, its actually happening right in front of our faces.

shortonsense wrote:Just as PO did 5 years ago. And now that it has been revealed that the claimed effects of that event were pretty much a bust, now its time to manufacture something else to get excited over.


pup55 wrote:In the case of Mexico, a few years ago their internal consumption was growing about 2% per year in the 2003-2005 time frame but has since decreased to about zero growth.
In Iran, their internal consumption was growing by 4% per year for the period 2003-2006, and in the last couple of years, it went to zero....





Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Iran 6.08% 1.06% 6.99% 5.68% 3.85% 3.78% 4.34% 0.01% 2.11%
Mex 3.57% -0.55% -3.31% 2.56% 1.76% 2.81% -0.20% 2.80% 0.63%


TheDude wrote:As JD pointed out producers don't accelerate consumption as they go into decline - that's beyond absurd, the populace don't collectively decide to ramp up the party when they hear the news. It has nothing to with real world examples, of course. UK consumption increased only 5.94 kb/d on average 1999-2005, when their production went into decline. In many years demand contracted sharply, check the BP data.


AirlinePilot wrote:shortonsense wrote:Just as PO did 5 years ago. And now that it has been revealed that the claimed effects of that event were pretty much a bust, now its time to manufacture something else to get excited over.
Your continued observance of some doomer prognostication is completely against the grain of what most of us here think will be the actual effects of Peak Oil.
AirlinePilot wrote:You also are in error in stating that PO was 5 years ago. There has been no general consensus yet that we have even peaked. Incorrectly pointing to the histoirc variations in countries/fields/or global production does not make it so.
AirlinePilot wrote: How can the "claimed events" have busted if we haven't peaked yet? You got a logic problem with that with your misunderstanding of what THE peak is.
AirlinePilot wrote: I think part of what you may be missing with this is the fact that as oil prices rise, producing nations (specifically the top 5) tend to do better economically due to the increased revenue and the industry expenditure as a result of that. I don't know how one measures that but to me it's intuitive.
We can observe that the oil exports are expected to go down by 2006-2007. The fraction of oil exports may fall below 40% after 2015 (Figure 10) and the US could lose an important and reliable source of oil imports (92% of Mexico's exports are for the US).

shortonsense wrote:AirlinePilot wrote: I think part of what you may be missing with this is the fact that as oil prices rise, producing nations (specifically the top 5) tend to do better economically due to the increased revenue and the industry expenditure as a result of that. I don't know how one measures that but to me it's intuitive.
Chavez doesn't seem to be making this intuitive theory of yours work very well. While he certainly did pretty well while prices were increasing, he hasn't done so well when the natural and completely expected reaction ( demand destruction ) clobbers his revenue stream.
They don't call it the resource curse for nothing.


Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 20 guests