ECN published an excellent essay on the whole practical scope of peak oil and climate change. Very well structured, balanced and complete without sacrificing truth insofar as I can tell.

http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2005/c05057.pdf

p. 18: Presently the optimistic view prevails

Mainstream thinking about the future of oil is generally optimistic about the timing and consequences of an oil peak. The low level of oil prices in the past decade seems to bear this out although recent convulsions have seeded doubts. Exemplary is the forecast of the World Energy Outlook 2004 published by the International Energy Agency (IEA). According to their reference scenario oil production will grow uninterruptedly from around 80 million barrels per day (mb/d) now to some 120 mb/day in 2030, an average growth of 1,6% annually. Their main message is that global oil production will not peak in the next 25 years. Scores of publications repeat this optimistic point of view in some form or another. But there are some persevering pessimists that cannot be sidelined so easily given the sound empirical nature of their arguments. Their main message is that global oil production will peak in the coming decade. They do not represent the views of the oil establishment or multilateral organisations although they have established their own networks such as the Association for the Study of Peak Oil & Gas (ASPO).

Of course, it is not so simple to decide who is right in the sense of being able to predict an oil peak accurately. Fortunately, in terms of designing appropriate energy R,D&D strategies there is no need to decide about the most probable future. What matters most is to include a probable range of plausible futures. In this respect it seems increasingly clear, that the pessimists are right in the sense that an oil peak in the near future is indeed plausible and that it would be useful to consider the possible consequences for global energy markets and the resulting drive for system innovations. For the purpose of this study we are referring to the period up to 2020 rather than any one particular year. The doomsayers are right in the sense that scenarios with limited availability of oil and sharply rising prices deserve serious attention in terms of the consequences for European energy transitions and related energy R,D&D strategies. Conventional scenarios seem to focus exclusively on the articulation of hopes (continuing lack of resource constraints), but they should also focus on the articulation of fears (early arrival of resource constraints).